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Abstract
The aim of this dissertation is to understand the political interests and activi-
ties of foreignmultinational corporations (MNCs) in the United States. Foreign
firms have strong incentives to influence US policies, as these policies heavily
impact the firms’ existing or potential sales and investment. While certain US
laws restrict foreign participation in political activities, domestically incorpo-
rated foreign firms have equal standing with American firms under US federal
election and lobbying laws. Therefore, I argue that foreign firms may create
new subsidiaries in the US or utilize existing subsidiaries as their domestic
political agents, as a way to access and influence US policymakers. I call this
phenomenon ‘political foreign investment.’
In the following chapters, I provide evidence in support of this theory. For
instance, in “Foreign Direct Investment in Political Influence,” I demonstrate
that majority foreign-owned subsidiaries, relative to American firms, are more
likely to sponsor Political Action Committees and give a greater amount of
campaign contributions to federal candidates. In “Foreign Lobbying through
Domestic Subsidiaries,” I similarly find thatmajority foreign-owned firms tend
to lobby more often and spend more on lobbying than American firms. The
positive association between foreign ownership and political activity in the two
papers holds after controlling for firm size, industry, state, and the extent of
global integration. Moreover, I demonstrate that features of the foreign par-
ent MNCs explain the outsized political activities of the domestic subsidiaries.
xii
Finally, in “Political FDI through Cross-border M&A” I conduct within-firm
panel analyses showing that foreign acquisition of domestic firms increase their
PAC and lobbying activities.
Collectively, this dissertation highlights the political role of foreign direct
investment, and sheds light on an understudied mechanism of foreign influ-
ence in the US. Also, the disproportionate political activities of the domestic
subsidiaries raise normative questions on whether loopholes in US laws are
circumvented by foreign interests.
xiii
Chapter 1
Foreign MNCs and US Politics
Multinational corporations (MNCs) have exerted political influence for as long as they
have existed. However, our understanding of their influence is largely limited to a specific
model of how Western firms engage in, and often dominate, the politics of developing
countries in which they invest. Such an approach, while important, largely ignores the
growing influence of foreign firms on US politics.
Over the past few decades, multinational corporations have emerged from all corners
of the world, and have become important political actors shaping the global economy. To
many of these firms, the US is an important marketplace for growing their business and
political influence. This is because the US has one of the largest consumer markets in the
world and attracts the largest amount of foreign direct investment.
ForeignMNCs are therefore heavily impacted by US policies. For instance, US policies
on tariff and non-tariff barriers, exchange rates, currency policy, and government procure-
ment directly affect foreign sales. Similarly, US regulations on foreign direct investment
and foreign banking determine foreign entry into the US. Meanwhile, global standards on
e-commerce, consumer safety, intellectual property rights, labor rights, etc., weigh heavily
on US regulatory decisions.
Consequently, foreignMNCs aremotivated to influence public policies in theUS. Specif-
ically, they need to devise political strategies to safeguard existing foreign sales and invest-
1
ment, or to create and secure future growth opportunities. However, extant theories do
not explain this phenomenon due to earlier attention given to Western MNC activities
elsewhere, and the MNC’s political influence in home countries.
This dissertation extends the current knowledge and theoretical understanding of the
relationship between foreign direct investment and domestic political power. Through a
combination of theoretical and empirical work, I analyze some of the most important and
pressing questions in this area. How do firms define their political interests in a highly
integrated global economy? How do foreign firms gain footholds in US politics? And
what are the normative implications of their political influence on national politics and
the general public?
Foreign firms with significant policy interests in the US have strong incentives to en-
gage in political activities in the US. However, US laws restrict foreign political activities
while allowingUS subsidiaries of foreign firms to engage in federal elections and lobbying
just like American firms. This legal environment, compounded with the attractiveness of
the US market, encourages foreign firms to gain local presence in the US through invest-
ing. Therefore, I argue that foreign firms, impacted by externalities of US policies, create
new subsidiaries or use existing subsidiaries to have their political interests represented
in the US. I call this phenomenon political foreign investment.
I examine this argument in the following chapters. In Chapter 2, “Foreign Direct In-
vestment in Political Influence," I test whether foreign firms engage in US federal elections
through their domestically incorporated subsidiaries. This question is particularly impor-
tant because the US Federal Election CampaignAct (FECA) prohibits foreign participation
in federal campaigns. To test the political foreign investment theory in the context of fed-
eral elections, I collected original data identifying the Political Action Committee (PAC)
activities of majority foreign-owned subsidiaries in the US.
I find that these US subsidiaries of foreign firms are significantly more politically ac-
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tive than comparable American firms. Controlling for firm characteristics such as size,
industry, location, and engagement in global markets, US subsidiaries of foreign firms are
more likely to sponsor a PAC and donate in greater amounts. I explore a variety of expla-
nations for this outsized political activity, and demonstrate that it is primarily driven by
the foreign parents’ desire to gain political influence in the US.
In Chapter 3, “Foreign Lobbying Through Domestic Subsidiaries," I examine the fed-
eral lobbying practices of domestic subsidiaries of foreign firms in the US. Unlike under
the FECA, foreign firms can lobby the US government as long as they disclose their activ-
ities under either the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) or the domestic Lobbying
Disclosure Act (LDA). For the first time, I identified all foreign-connected lobbying under
the LDA. With these data, I show that the US subsidiaries’ lobbying activities also corrob-
orate my political foreign investment theory.
First, I show that 90% of the foreign corporate clients are US subsidiaries of foreign
firms, rather than the parent firms. In addition, I show that these subsidiaries lobby sig-
nificantly more often and spend more on lobbying activities than comparable American
firms. Moreover, I find that US subsidiaries of foreign firms lobby on a greater variety of
issues, which suggests that they represent interests of both the subsidiaries and the foreign
parents. I also show that they lobby extensively on issue areas which can have large neg-
ative effects on parent companies, in other words, with large externalities. These include
trade and tariff policy, rules governing intellectual property rights, and industry-specific
regulation which may serve to block foreign direct investment.
In Chapter 4, “Political FDI ThroughCross-borderM&A,” I build a stronger causal case
for the political foreign investment theory by exploiting changes in majority ownership of
US firms over time. I assemble unique panel datasets of all US-based firms that spon-
sored corporate PACs or disclosed their lobbying activities under the LDA, and that also
experienced a change in majority ownership through mergers and acquisitions (M&A),
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from 1997 to 2018. Then I conduct within-firm analyses to test whether foreign-ownership
through cross-border M&A changes domestic firms’ political activities in ways suggested
in Chapters 2 and 3.
I find that domestic firms tend to give more to federal candidates when they become
majority foreign-owned. Similarly, the dollar amount of total and issue-specific lobbying
spending tend to increase once firms are majority foreign-owned. In contrast, no signif-
icant changes are observed when a domestic firm is consolidated into another domestic
firm. I also find that domestic firms change their lobbying focus to issue areas of interest
to their foreign parents following cross-border M&A. Collectively, these findings suggest
that the acquired subsidiaries serve a political role in accessing and influencing policy-
makers in the US.
Taken together, these chapters highlight the political role of foreign direct investment in
the US – a largely overlooked area in previous research. They reveal that foreign partici-
pation in domestic politics is occurring more than what was previously thought. In fact, I
find thatmajority foreign-owned subsidiaries in theUS accounted formore than 11%of to-
tal corporate political giving and over 17% of corporate lobbying during the 2016 election
cycle, despite contributing only 5% to the private sector economy. This dissertation raises
normative and legal questions regarding loopholes in US laws and possible amendments
that could bolster government protection of American interests.
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Chapter 2
Foreign Direct Investment in
Political Influence
Abstract
Do foreign firms engage in domestic politics, and if so, why? I argue that foreign firms,
impacted byUS policies, employ subsidiaries in theUS to represent their political interests
in federal elections. Using original data collected for the population of corporate givers
during recent election cycles, I findUS subsidiaries of foreign firms to be significantlymore
politically active than similarly sized American firms located in the same industry. These
subsidiaries are much more likely to sponsor a Political Action Committee and donate in
greater amounts. I explore a variety of explanations for this outsized political activity, and
demonstrate that it is driven in part by the foreign parent firms’ desire to gain a political
foothold in the United States. Foreign direct investment therefore serves as an investment
in political influence.
2.1 Introduction
Foreign influence on domestic politics has become a salient issue. The American public is
alarmed by foreign countries’ ability to influence domestic elections from afar; however,
5
not much attention has been given to a critical channel of foreign influence embedded
in the domestic political system. Although foreign firms are categorically banned from
participating in federal elections by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, their do-
mestically incorporated subsidiaries may engage in federal campaigns just like American
firms. For example, the American subsidiary of UBS (a financial services company head-
quartered in Switzerland), UBSAmericas Inc., has cut checks to federal candidates on both
sides of the aisle through its Political Action Committee (PAC), totaling around $1.45 mil-
lion per election cycle in recent years. Overall, majority foreign-owned US subsidiaries
accounted for more than 11% of total corporate PAC giving to federal candidates during
the 2016 election cycle.
In this paper, I investigate the patterns of PAC giving by US subsidiaries of foreign
firms to understand their motive for this political action. The primary argument of this
paper is that foreign direct investment partly serves as an investment in political influence.
Because firms engaged in global markets are heavily impacted by the national policies of
other countries, they have strong incentives to engage in the domestic politics of countries
that may be the source of such externalities. I theorize that foreign firms create new do-
mestic subsidiaries or utilize existing domestic subsidiaries as their local political agents
in these markets, actions that I call political foreign investment by foreign firms. In this
way, domestic subsidiaries can legally build political allies in a host country as a way to in-
fluence national politics inways alignedwith the interests of their foreign principals. If US
subsidiaries of foreign firms engage in federal elections on behalf of their foreign parents,
I expect the observed political engagement of these subsidiaries to be significantly greater
than those of similarly sized American firms, which do not need to necessarily represent
a broader range of stakes of an entire corporate network. I also expect the patterns of PAC
giving by domestic subsidiaries to reflect the interests and characteristics of their foreign
parents.
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To examine these theoretical expectations, I compiled an original dataset that identifies
PAC giving patterns by the US subsidiaries of foreign firms. I collected andmerged politi-
cal data (e.g., total amount of campaign contributions, a breakdown of giving to each Party
and Chamber) of all corporate PACs in the US reported to be active during the 2013-2014
and 2015-2016 election years along with firm data (e.g., operating revenue, number of em-
ployees, industry classification, ownership structure) of their sponsoring firms. For the
compilation, I identified the sponsoring firm of each corporate PAC based on the name
and street address of its connected organization reported in individual PAC Statements
of Organization filed to the Federal Election Commission. From these Statements, I also
gathered information about when the corporate PAC was first established and whether
or not the PAC is a lobbyist/registrant PAC, which is a committee that a lobbyist estab-
lishes and/or controls. Finally I identified all US subsidiaries of foreign firms based on
information about their Global Ultimate Owners.
With this dataset, I analyze patterns of corporate PAC giving in the United States. I
first demonstrate that foreign ownership has a positive and significant association with
the likelihood of a firm to sponsor a corporate PAC. I also show that among the spon-
sored PACs, foreign ownership has a positive and significant association with the level of
campaign contributions directed to federal candidates. Both patterns hold when control-
ling for industry and location of the sponsoring firms, and also when analyzed among
multinational firms only. These findings are contrary to those of earlier studies which
analyze PAC giving based on a sample of Fortune 500 firms during the 1987 election cy-
cle (Walke and Huckabee, 1989; Mitchell, Hansen and Jepsen, 1997; Hansen and Mitchell,
2000). However, this sampling method leaves out the majority of domestic subsidiaries,
that are smaller than 500 of the largest US firms but owned by very large foreign multina-
tionals, from the analyses. Therefore, the current study provides a more comprehensive
demonstration of foreign corporate giving in the United States.
7
I then conduct empirical tests to explain this greater political intensity of US sub-
sidiaries of foreign firms through the lens of the proposed political foreign investment
theory. For instance, the size of a firm can be used as a measure of its policy interests and
resources. When I compare the association between the level of campaign contributions
and firm sizes of the domestic subsidiaries and their foreign parents, the latter in fact has
a larger and stronger association. I also demonstrate that domestic subsidiaries tend to
give larger amount of donations when their parents have strong trade interests with the
US. Finally, I present a series of evidence that foreign parents of domestic subsidiaries
have strong policy interests in the US, and that the foreign-connected PACs give strategi-
cally under close supervision of lobbyists. Collectively, these findings lend support to the
theory of political foreign investment.
It is conceivable that the foreign-connected PACs’ greater political intensity may be
a result of ‘foreignness premium.’ For example, US subsidiaries of foreign firms might
be compelled to compensate legislators for representing a group toward which domes-
tic constituents feel unsympathetic; or the subsidiaries may need to compensate for their
political inexperience in the US. I rule out these alternative mechanisms by showing that
public attitude toward the foreign-connected PACs’ countries of origin has no impact on
the level of political giving; also, foreign-connected PACs that are older, and so have more
experience, tend to give more, and not less.
This investigation connects to the political science literature in several ways. I build
on the interest group politics literature by highlighting how domestic firms include na-
tive firms and a significant number of domestically incorporated foreign firms. By dis-
tinguishing these firms by global ultimate ownership, I demonstrate how political insti-
tutions in the US actually allow foreign intervention in their legal political processes. I
also contribute to the growing body of firm-level theories of international political econ-
omy (Bombardini, 2008; Weymouth, 2012; Kim, 2017; Osgood et al., 2017) by providing a
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theoretical framework that explains the political activities of foreign multinationals in the
US. In particular, this study expands our understanding of the politics of foreign direct in-
vestment, which has been largely limited to the bargaining betweenWestern multination-
als and developing host countries (Vernon, 1971; Kobrin, 1987; Jensen, 2008; Wellhausen,
2014). Finally, I connect to the literature on corporate political activities (Useem, 1986;
Hillman, Keim and Schuler, 2004; Lux, Crook and Woehr, 2011) by systematically com-
paring the PAC activities of native and foreign-originating firms in the US based on newly
collected data.
2.2 Foreign Corporate Engagement in Federal Elections
While the US federal election law appears to categorically ban foreign participation, it is
relatively open to this in practice. In fact, the amount of PAC donations made by majority
foreign-owned firms over the past twenty years hasmore than quadrupled, growing twice
as fast as those made by American firms as shown in Figure 2.1. In recent election cycles,
more than 11% of all corporate PAC donations to US federal candidates wasmade by these
majority foreign-owned US subsidiaries.
The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971 was designed to ensure that the US
government is most accountable to its citizens, and to protect elections from foreign influ-
ence. The law prohibits any foreign nationals from contributing, donating, or spending
funds in connection with any federal, state, or local elections, either directly or indirectly.
However, US firms that are owned/controlled by a foreign national is not itself a foreign
national so long as the corporation is organized under domestic laws and has its “principal
place of business” within the US. Therefore, subsidiaries of foreign firms can legally form
a “foreign-connected PAC” and participate in this country’s privately financed election
system just like American firms.
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Figure 2.1: Dollar amount of political giving by corporate PACs (1997-2016)
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Note: I use two different scales to emphasize the growth of campaign contribu-
tions by foreign-connected PACs.
Political activities of these foreign-connected PACs have been justified as “instruments
of the US employees of foreign-owned companies” and the FEC has stated that prohibit-
ing the establishment of these PACs “would deprive United States citizens of their right to
make company-based contributions to political candidates.”1 However, even some mem-
bers of the FEC have firmly believed that the subsidiaries’ decisions to allocate their funds
are likely to reflect the overseas corporate and political interests of the parent companies.2
In the 1980s, when Japanese firms were actively acquiring US firms and property, Sena-
tor Lloyd Bentsen warned that allowing subsidiaries of foreign firms to participate in US
elections is “open[ing] the door to foreign influence in our elections.”
There have been multiple attempts to regulate foreign participation in US elections.
1 See “U.S. Elections Got More Foreign Cash,” New York Times (May 24, 1987), by Martin Tolchin. FEC
regulations require any funds the PAC uses to affect elections to be raised voluntarily by US citizens or
permanent resident aliens, and require them only to participate in spending or contributions decisions.
2 Thomas E. Harris, former chairman of the FEC, said “the PAC is always controlled by the top manage-
ment of the corporation” and “PACs of foreign-owned domestic companies therefore circumvented the
Congressional intent to bar foreign nationals from influencing American elections.”
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In quick response to Citizens United, Democrats pushed for the DISCLOSE Act (of 2010),
which would have required more disclosure of political donors and tightened restrictions
on the political activities of US subsidiaries of foreign firms. However, the bill was filibus-
tered and blocked by Senate Republicans. Obama called the Senate outcome “a victory
for special interests and U.S. corporations – including foreign-controlled ones.” As fears
of foreign money spiked following Russia’s alleged interference in US elections, the DIS-
CLOSE Act (of 2018) was reintroduced on June 28, 2018.3
Note that there is a rich literature on corporate lobbying. But we have limited knowl-
edge of foreign corporate lobbying, as studies on foreign lobbying has focused on the Foreign
Agents RegistrationAct (FARA) reports (Gawande, Krishna andRobbins, 2006). While for-
eign governments and parties disclose their activities under FARA, a largely overlooked
practice is how most foreign corporate clients disclose their activities under the domestic
Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 through domestic subsidiaries.4 Unlike under the fed-
eral election law, foreign firms based abroad and those incorporated in the US can both
engage in lobbying activities. In this paper, I focus on federal elections only to highlight
the political role of domestic subsidiaries of foreign firms.
2.3 Theory of Political Foreign Investment
Government policies in the US affect businesses across borders. For instance, tariff and
non-tariff barriers affect foreign firms trading with the US from abroad. Increasingly, for-
3 Senator Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI) and Congressman David Cicilline (D-RI) introduced the bicameral
legislation which would prohibit domestic corporations with significant foreign control from spending
money in US elections. Meanwhile, the Department of Treasury has issued a new policy on July 16, 2018
that could make it more difficult for the government to prevent foreign entities from secretly funding
political activity in the US. For instance, see “New IRS Rules Could Protect Foreign Dark Money in U.S.
Elections", Sludge (July 16, 2018), by Donald Shaw.
4 In Chapter 3, I analyze the LDA reports and find most of foreign corporate lobbying to be done through
domestic subsidiaries of foreign firms.
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eign sellers and buyers engage heavily in e-commerce with the US, and their profits are
impacted by policies relating to cross-border shipping, security restrictions, taxes, and
complex federal and state regulations. Meanwhile, US decisions on regulatory matters
heavily influence global standards on drugs, consumer safety, intellectual property rights,
labor, environment, etc., to which foreign firmsmust comply. Since their inception, the US
federal antitrust laws have applied to “commerce with foreign nations”; and foreign anti-
competitive conduct has increasingly been subject to investigation with the expansion of
international trade. Recent executive orders to expand “Buy American” posed a serious
threat to foreign firms’ access to US government procurement opportunities.
In addition, foreign firms’ opportunities to invest in the US and fortunes of their extant
investment are inherently impacted by US policies. For instance, the Foreign Investment
Risk ReviewModernizationAct of 2018 expanded the jurisdiction and powers of the Com-
mittee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to scrutinize and potentially
reject foreign investment. Changes in immigration laws can be a significant burden for
foreign multinationals as US subsidiaries tend to rely heavily on foreign personnel from
their home country. Recently, policies in accordance with the “Hire American” executive
order strengthened control of entry and inspection of foreignworkers, making it easier for
immigration officials to reject visa applications andmore difficult to extend them. Follow-
ing the 2008 financial crisis, the Federal Reserve Board (in accordancewith theDodd-Frank
Act) strengthened the regulation of foreign banks that wish to maintain a banking pres-
ence in the US. In addition, foreign multinationals are subject to aggressive US transfer
pricing rules; and their intrafirm trade behavior is impacted by US tax regulations and is
susceptible to exchange rate risks.
Therefore, foreign firms, whether they have operations in the US or not, are heavily
impacted by US government policies. In fact, the external effects of policies created by the
US, the world’s largest consumer market and dominant player in international economic
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institutions, are critical for any foreign firm that wants to expand its operations and influ-
ence worldwide. This creates a strong incentive for foreign firms to engage in domestic
political activities in the US. Meanwhile, as explained earlier, the FECA applies ‘national
treatment’ to domestically incorporated foreign firms. While foreign firms cannot engage
in federal elections, they can gain access to federal campaigns through their domestically
incorporated subsidiaries. Moreover, the administrative requirements to establish a PAC
in the US are quite minimal for any firm. These involve several simple tasks of having
the corporation’s Board approve the creation of a PAC, opening a separate checking ac-
count for the PAC, and filing a Statement of Organization with the FEC within ten days of
formally creating the PAC. At that point, the PAC can begin its fundraising efforts.
Together, foreign firms’ desire to engage in US policymaking processes and politics
more generally, and the domestic legal environment that allows domestically incorporated
foreign firms to equally participate in federal elections, encourage foreign firms to engage
in US elections through domestic subsidiaries. Thus, foreign firmsmay initiate foreign di-
rect investment and create new subsidiaries in the US as a channel to connect with federal
candidates; or for those already with local presence, being able to utilize the subsidiaries
as a way to have the foreign firms’ policy interests represented in the US can be a useful
bonus for foreign firms. I call this ‘political foreign investment’ by foreign firms. Conse-
quently, domestic subsidiaries of these firms act as political agents of their foreign parents,
gaining access to federal elections and policymaking in the US.
Empirical Implications
Thepolitical foreign investment theory suggests that domestic subsidiaries of foreignfirms
would represent the complete set of policy interests of their (usually much larger) parent
firms abroad. Therefore, I expect the political engagement of domestic subsidiaries of
foreign firms to be disproportionate to their economic presence in the US. Then, the ob-
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served political engagement of foreign-connected PACs sponsored by these subsidiaries
is expected to be more active than that of PACs sponsored by American firms that are oth-
erwise comparable to the US subsidiaries. Therefore, controlling for firm characteristics
such as size, industry, and location, I expect foreign ownership of a sponsoring firm to be
positively associated with a connected PAC’s observed political engagement in US federal
campaigns.
I test two patterns of PAC giving among foreign-owned and American firms. First, I
test the likelihood of firms based in the US to sponsor a corporate PAC.Next, I examine the
dollar amount of campaign contributionsmade to federal candidates by theAmerican and
foreign-connected corporate PACs. Relative to American firms, I expect US subsidiaries of
foreign firms to sponsor a corporate PAC more often, and their connected PACs to donate
in greater dollar amounts.
I also conduct a series of empirical tests, as summarized in Table 2.1, in order to un-
derstand how the characteristics and interests of the foreign parent firms contribute to
explaining the patterns of PAC giving by the US subsidiaries. In the literature of corpo-
rate political activities, firm size reflects the amount of political resources and the breadth
of a firm’s policy interests (Chong and Gradstein, 2010;Weymouth, 2012). Meanwhile, the
foreign parents of US subsidiaries are very large (Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple, 2004). If
domestic subsidiaries engage in federal elections only to defend their own interests in the
US, the size of their foreign parents should be orthogonal to the domestic subsidiaries’ po-
litical engagement. However, if the subsidiaries represent their foreign parents’ interests,
I expect the amount of campaign contributions by the subsidiaries to scale with the size
of the much larger foreign parents.
Meanwhile, if the external impact of US policies to the foreign parent firms trigger the
PAC giving by domestic subsidiaries, those with foreign parents that are heavily impacted
by US policies are expected to give the most to federal candidates. One policy area that
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Table 2.1: Empirical implications of the political foreign investment theory
Theory: Political Foreign Investment
Patterns of PAC giving
Likelihood of PAC giving: US subsidiaries of foreign firms (vs. comparable American firms) are more likely to
sponsor a PAC.
Level of PAC giving: Foreign-connected PACs (vs. comparable American PACs) are expected to give in
greater amounts.
Explaining the outsized PAC giving by US subsidiaries
PAC giving scales with: the size of foreign parent firm
PAC giving reflects: exposure of foreign parent firm to US policies
Coordination with parent firm: foreign parent firm engages in lobbying activities
Coordination with lobbyists: foreign-connected PACs established or controlled by lobbyists
Strategic giving behavior: foreign-connected PACs give to both Parties and Chambers
heavily impacts foreign firms is international trade. I use measures of the revealed com-
parative advantage of the foreign firms against the US (proxy for exports to the US), and
the number of foreign firms’ operations in US FTA partners (proxy for trade with the US),
to infer whether foreign-connected PACs controlled by foreign parent firms that are sus-
ceptible to US trade policy decisions tend to give more than those with less trade interests.
Finally, if the foreign parent firms of the domestic subsidiaries have strong policy inter-
ests in the US, I expect other political channels at the foreign firms’ disposal to be actively
utilized. Since foreign firms can lobby from abroad, I expect the foreign parents of the
domestic subsidiaries with connected PACs to engage in lobbying activities. In addition,
if their domestic subsidiaries play a political role in the US on behalf of them, I expect
a tight coordination between foreign-connected PACs and lobbyists, suggesting that con-
nections are built to leverage decision making on Capitol Hill. Relatedly, I expect foreign-
connected PACs to engage in a strategic giving behavior that maximizes political capture
(Barber, 2016). Rather than following certain ideological lines, I expect the PACs to give
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more equally to both Parties and Chambers so that their favors are easily adopted across
ideological lines and bodies of government.
2.4 The Data
I created an original dataset that identifies the PACgiving byAmerican and foreign-owned
firms in the US during the 2013-2014 and 2015-2016 election years. I first downloaded the
population of 1,768 active ’corporation’ type PACs from the FEC data catalogue for the
2014 election cycle, and another 1,771 active ’corporation’ type PACs for the 2016 election
cycle, along with their committee IDs and names. Using these identifiers, I hand collected
political data – the total amount of campaign contributions from the corporate PAC to fed-
eral candidates during each election cycle, by Party and by Chamber – for each committee
based on summary data from the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP). Eventually, among
the total 3,539 corporate PAC-election cycle pairs, 328 were dropped: those included in the
FEC data catalog but no longer existing or neglected by the CRP, the non-connected PACs,
and a group of non-producers such as unions and ideological interest groups.
By pulling up individual Statements of Organization reported to the FEC, I identi-
fied the connected organization of each corporate PAC along with its street address. The
3,211 corporate PAC-election cycle pairs were sponsored by 1,636 unique firms over the
two election cycles. I matched the political data collected for the corporate PAC-election
cycle pairs with firm data of the connected organizations. Since firm-level financial data
are often scarce (especially for smaller and private firms), I used both Orbis and Dun &
Bradstreet Hoovers as complementary sources to construct a measure of firm size. After
verifying that the operating revenue data from the two datasets were highly correlated
(ρ=.97), I took the average of the two revenues if both sources provided information; if
16
not, I used information from either source.5 I also collected the number of employees as
an alternative measure of firm size, which I use as a robustness check in the Appendix for
the main models. 6-digit NAICS industry codes of the sponsoring firms were collected
and regrouped into sector level controls.6
Additionally, I created state controls for the sponsoring firms from their street ad-
dresses. This allows me to control for any state specific differences that systematically
alter the political behavior of firms based on where they are located. Examples include
differences in state regulations, business environment, or characteristics of the state legis-
latures that affect the likelihood and level of corporate PAC giving.
One of themost important pieces of information collected for this study is ameasure of
foreign ownership for the sponsoring firms, and subsequently the connected PACs, dur-
ing each election cycle. Based on firm ownership structure information provided byOrbis,
and verifying this information with internet resources on recent M&A transactions, I col-
lected data on the country of ultimate ownership of each sponsoring firm from 2013 to
2016. Then, I constructed a ‘foreign ownership’ binary indicator variable for all corporate
PACs, depending on whether a firm was majority American or foreign-owned during the
2014 and 2016 election cycles.
Figure 2.2 presents the top home countries of the foreign-connected PACs. About
twenty percent of the foreign-connectedPACs are sponsored byBritish corporations; many
are sponsored by firms based in other parts of Europe, Canada, and Japan.7 Notably, there
were no Russian firms with an active corporate PAC during the period. Similarly, there
5 Orbis and D&B Hoovers each had revenue data for 74.6% and 83.6% of the sponsoring firms; together, I
was able to assemble financial data for 92.6% of the firms.
6 I use the 2-digit NAICS to represent sectors. For the manufacturing sectors, I kept NAICS 31, 32, and 33
separately; NAICS 44-45 (Retail Trade) and 48-49 (Transportation andWarehousing) are bundled together.
I exclude NAICS 92 (Public Administration) from the analyses.
7 The three ’multi’ cases include Shire Regenerative and Shire Viropharma Inc, both owned by Shire PLC
which is a Jersey-registered, Irish-headquartered company originating in the UKwith an operational base
in the US; the other isMDBAwith 37.5% ownership byAirbus Defence, 37.5% ownership by BAE Systems,
and 25% ownership by Leonardo as of 2017.
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Figure 2.2: Home countries of US subsidiaries that engaged in federal elections (2014 & 2016 election cycles)
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was one corporate PAC sponsored by a Chinese firm which engaged in political giving in
both election cycles.8
To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to propose a theory that explains
the motivation for political engagement by US subsidiaries of foreign firms. It is also the
first to empirically examine the universe of corporate contributors in the US.
2.5 Empirical Tests and Results
I analyze the PAC giving of US subsidiaries of foreign firms and American firms at two
different levels: 1) the likelihood of PAC giving by firms and 2) the level of campaign contri-
8 During the 2016 election cycle, Chinese Shineway Group (now WH Group) gave $93,650 to candidates
through its US subsidiary, Smithfield Foods. Chinese Haier Group newly established a PAC through its
Haier US Appliance Solutions in 2016, but it did not make any contributions during the election cycle.
Note that I focus on corporate political giving through corporate PACs only in this paper, arguably the
most visible and legal form of political participation by firms in US federal elections. Funds delivered to
super PACs or trade associations and gifts made by individuals outside of corporate PACs are not included
here. Informal channels are not discussed as well. In that sense, this paper captures the minimum level of
foreign-connected political engagement in US federal elections.
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butions among corporate sponsored PACs. I begin with a section on firms’ likelihood of
PAC giving – the extensive margin – below.
2.5.1 Extensive Margin: The Likelihood of PAC Giving
Testing firms’ likelihood of political mobilization in the US requires constructing a repre-
sentative sample of US-based firms from its population. Among all active firms located
in the US identified by Orbis, I first constructed a stratified sample of 200,000 US-based
firms.9 Then, I merged this sample with the 1,636 unique firms that sponsored a corporate
PAC over the two election cycles. Note that I focus my analysis on unique firms since most
firms with connected-PACs during the 2014 election cycle continued to make donations
through those PACs in the 2016 election cycle. After dropping the 115 firms that overlap
with the random sample that I constructed, I had a final sample size of 201,521. For all
firms in my final sample, I downloaded measures of their firm size, industry, and street
address. Based on the ultimate global owner, I again created a foreign ownership variable
for all firms; about 1.5% of the sample were majority foreign-owned.
Regression analysis for the likelihood of PAC giving
I infer the likelihood of PAC giving for the final sample of firms using a conditional
logistic regression model. For the binary outcome variable of political giving, I assigned
the value 1 to the 1,636 firms that sponsored a corporate PAC during the 2014 and/or 2016
election cycle. The remaining firms were assigned a value 0 since they did not have con-
nected PACs during the period. The likelihood that a firm sponsors a PAC is explained by
9 I randomly sampled 50,000 firms from the “very large,” “large,” and “medium”Orbis firm size categories,
and another 50,000 “small” firms from each the manufacturing and agriculture sectors (NAICS 11, 21, 31-
33) and services sectors (NAICS 22, 23, 42-81). For the regression analyses, I weighted each firm in the
sample by the number of firms in the population of each size-sector group divided by the number of
total draws accounting for the overlaps (200,000-115=199,885), so that a single firm in my sample would
represent multiple firms in the population by a relevant weight that restores the size-sector proportion to
the population.
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sponsoring firm size (measured in common log transformed operating revenue), foreign
ownership, and an interaction term of these two variables.
Since the political foreign investment theory suggests that domestic subsidiaries repre-
sent policy interests of their foreign parent firms in the US, I do not expect the PAC giving
patterns by domestic subsidiaries to be determined by the sponsoring firm size in the US
so much as that of American firms. To reflect this idea, I include an interaction term that
allows foreign ownership to moderate the relationship between sponsoring firm size in
the US and PAC giving. Finally, I stratify the sample by industry sectors and the states in
which firms are located so that I test whether domestic subsidiaries are disproportionately
politically active among comparable US-based firms.10
Table 2.2 summarizes the result of the conditional logistic regression model. The for-
eign ownership variable is positive and statistically significant; and this finding corrob-
orates the theoretical prediction that US subsidiaries of foreign firms are expected to be
more politically active than similarly sized American firms in terms of their propensity to
mobilize. The size of the sponsoring firm in the US has a general positive association with
the likelihood of a firm to engage in political giving. The interaction coefficient, however,
is roughly -0.9 (the difference in the change in log odds yielded by a tenfold increase in
size among US subsidiaries of foreign firms and American firms), suggesting an ratio of
odds ratio (foreign over American) of roughly 0.4 (e−0.9). In other words, the size of the
sponsoring firm in the US has less than half the impact on that firm’s likelihood of spon-
soring a PAC for US subsidiaries of foreign firms, relative to that of America firms. This
relationship is graphically presented in Figure 2.3 with 95% confidence intervals.
The likelihood of sponsoring a corporate PAC increases with firm size for both Ameri-
10 In the conditional logistic regression model, the total number of success is fixed with each strata, here the
unique combinations of state and industry sector. Note that the strata variables do not contribute to the
degrees of freedom. The estimate I get for foreign ownership is an average ‘within’ effect, as the estimate
entirely controls for any tendencies for particular states and industry sectors to have more or less foreign
ownership by always comparing the odds of contribution within these strata.
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Table 2.2: Extensive margin of political giving
binary outcome of political giving
foreign ownership 10.03∗∗∗
(0.67)
log revenue 2.60∗∗∗
(0.03)
foreign ownership·log revenue −0.93∗∗∗
(0.08)
Observations 174,097
Max. Possible R2 0.15
Note: stratified by industry and state. ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Figure 2.3: Predicted probability of political giving by firm size and ownership
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can andmajority foreign-owned firms. Once large enough to politicallymobilize, majority
foreign-owned firms have a greater likelihood of sponsoring a corporate PAC for all firm
sizes in the sample; however, once firm size is large enough that there is a majority chance
of political mobilization, foreign ownership of a firm does not seem to matter as much.
In Appendix A2.8, I present alternative models including a regular logistic regression
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model with statistical fixed effects and random effects for industry sectors and states. In
Appendix A2.9, I present models using the number of employees as an alternative mea-
sure of firm size. The relationship between political mobilization, firm size, and foreign
ownership are consistent across the alternativemodel specifications. Overall, foreign own-
ership of a firm has a positive and statistically significant association with the likelihood
of PAC giving in the US.
2.5.2 Intensive Margin: The Level of PAC Giving
Now I discuss firms’ PAC giving at the intensive margin – the dollar amount of campaign
contributions directed to federal candidates through their corporate sponsoredPACs. Note
that the unit of analysis changes from unique firms to corporate PAC-election cycle pairs,
as it is the PACs that actually raise and deliver funds in each election cycle.11 I analyze 2,830
corporate PAC-election cycle pairs, after dropping 381 pairs that made zero contributions
over the two election cycles.12
Regression analysis for the level of PAC giving
I test the dollar amount of campaign contributions for the PAC-election cycle pairs
using an ordinary least square regression model. The total amount of (common log trans-
formed) campaign contributionsmade by a PAC in an election cycle is explained by the size
of its sponsoring firm (measured in common log transformed operating revenue), foreign
ownership, and an interaction term of the two variables, which allow foreign ownership
11Analyzing political giving at the individual PAC level might be a concern if firms tend to divert their
political giving through multiple affiliated PACs that share a single limit of campaign contributions. See
Appendix A2.15 for a further discussion on why the design of the FECA rule might have been a concern,
but actually is not.
12Here I drop these PACs from the analysis to focus on non-zero contributions. However, including or
excluding the 381 pairs does not change the results. In a two-step hurdle model linking the extensive and
intensive margin analyses in Appendix A2.12, I add $1 dollar to the firms that made zero contributions
during the 2014 or 2016 election cycles in order to distinguish them from firms that are not connected to
any PACs at all. The same relationship holds among variables.
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to moderate the relationship between firm size and the level of PAC giving as above. I also
include controls for election cycle, industry sector, and state.13
Table 2.3 summarizes the results – models (1) and (2) test the relationship among all
corporate PAC-election cycle pairs in the data; in models (3) and (4), I conduct sub-sample
analyses among corporate PAC-election cycle pairs whose sponsoring firm has at least one
global operation, and is thus a multinational firm. The goal of the sub-sample analyses
is to make the reference American group even more comparable to the foreign-connected
group, in terms of their multinational characteristics.
Again, the foreign ownership variable is positive and statistically significant across all
models, corroborating the theoretical prediction that US subsidiaries of foreign firms will
engage more intensively in federal elections than comparable American firms. Similar to
above, the size of the sponsoring firm in the US has a general positive relationship with
the level of PAC giving, but with a negative interaction term. This relationship is visu-
alized in Figure 2.4: the trend lines, representing the relationship between a sponsoring
firm’s operating revenue and the total amount of campaign contributions by its corporate
sponsored PAC in an election cycle, is flatter for foreign-connected PACs compared to that
of American PACs.
Finding foreign ownership to have a positive and statistically significant association
with corporate political giving at both the extensive and intensive margins is striking. In
fact, earlier empirical studies on this topic sample firms from Fortune 500 companies to
study the 1987 election cycle, and find foreign-originating firms to be constrained in their
political behavior, if not indistinguishable from American firms (Mitchell, Hansen and
Jepsen, 1997; Hansen and Mitchell, 2000).14 However, this sampling method induces an
13Note that the operating revenue of sponsoring firms is fixed over the two election cycles. Thus, the data
are not strictly in a panel form. In order to address the issue of data dependency, I alternatively run a
mixed model controlling for committee IDs in Appendix A2.10. The results are largely identical.
14See Averyt (1990), Mitchell (1995), and Rehbein (1995) for more studies on the political engagement of US
subsidiaries of foreign firms.
23
Table 2.3: Intensive margin of political giving
total contributions in logs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
foreign ownership 1.96∗∗∗ 1.73∗∗∗ 2.22∗∗∗ 1.88∗∗∗
(0.32) (0.33) (0.35) (0.36)
log revenue 0.30∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
foreign ownership·log revenue −0.21∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗ −0.25∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Election Cycle FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 2,608 2,604 1,603 1,603
Adjusted R2 0.20 0.23 0.17 0.20
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Figure 2.4: Dollar amount of political giving by firm size and ownership
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important bias because Fortune 500 companies in the USwill capture the largest American
firms anddomestically incorporated foreign firms, but not themajority of subsidiaries that
have a smaller presence in the US but are owned by very large foreign multinationals as
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big as Fortune 500.15
In fact, Fortune 500 companies in terms of the 2014 or 2016 year-end revenues far sur-
pass the point where the trend lines of American and foreign-owned firms intersect in
Figure 2.4. Consequently, if I were to simulate earlier work to analyze the association be-
tween foreign ownership and corporate political activities, I would be considering only
26% of all corporate givers at the very right end.16 Instead, using population data of all
corporate givers, I uncover two important findings. First, the majority of firms that politi-
cally mobilize are not always very large in the US – whether American or foreign-owned.
In addition, data suggests that many of the US subsidiaries of foreign firmsmake outsized
political donations to federal elections relative to American firms.
In Appendix A2.12, I aggregate the connected PACs’ political giving over two election
cycles and assign the sum to each unique sponsoring firm in order to conduct a two-step
hurdle model that links the extensive and intensive margin analyses at the firm level. The
first step of the model tests firms’ likelihood of sponsoring a PAC (using binomial logistic
regression) based on the constructed sample, and the second step tests the total amount
of campaign contributions made by these firms over the two election cycles (using a Pois-
son count model). I test this model to address any concerns that the population of firms
that sponsor PACs might be systematically different from the representative sample of
US firms, and thus, bias the intensive margin analysis. However, the patterns of political
giving at both the extensive and intensive margin remain the same in a two-step hurdle
model; the intensive margin analysis does not appear to suffer from selection.
15For instance, US subsidiaries of Airbus, Nestle, Bayer, Mitsubishi, etc. will all be neglected in the analysis
when sampling only among largest firms based in the US.
16The two revenue curves intersect where firm size measured in common logged revenue equals 9.45. This
corresponds to a firm size of roughly 2.84 billion USD in annual operating revenue. Meanwhile, the small-
est Fortune 500 company in 2015 (year end revenue of 2014), was McGraw Hill Financial, at a much larger
operating revenue of 5.19 billion USD; the smallest Fortune 500 in 2017 (year end revenue of 2016), was
ABM Industries, at 5.15 billion USD.
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2.5.3 Explaining the Outsized Political Giving by US Subsidiaries
Here, I conduct a series of empirical tests that collectively explain the outsized PAC giving
by US subsidiaries of foreign firms. I demonstrate that firm characteristics and interests of
the foreign parent firms are associatedwith the pattern of PACgiving by the subsidiaries. I
also provide evidence that foreign parents of the subsidiaries in fact have strong interests
US policies, and that the domestic subsidiaries give in ways that supposedly maximize
political influence in Capitol Hill. These findings lend support for the political foreign
investment theory.
Political intensity scales with the size of foreign parent firm
The literature suggests firm size to be a measure of firms’ policy interests and their ca-
pacity to engage in political activities. Earlier, I have established the association between
the dollar amount of campaign contributions by foreign-connected PACs and the size of
the sponsoring US subsidiaries, which was in a smaller magnitude than the association
between political giving by American PACs and the size of their sponsoring American
firms. If domestic subsidiaries of foreign firms engage politically only to represent in-
terests of their operations in the US, the size of the foreign parent should be orthogonal
to foreign-connected PAC giving. However, if the subsidiaries represent the policy inter-
ests of their foreign parent firms, the size of the foreign parent should be associated with
foreign-connected PAC giving.
In Table 2.4, I present models explaining the total amount of PAC giving by foreign-
connected PACs with measures of sizes of the sponsoring domestic subsidiaries and their
foreign parents. Both firm sizes are associated with the amount of foreign-connected PAC
giving. In the last model, I normalize both the dollar amount of campaign contributions
as well as firm sizes from 0 to 1, so that I can compare the effect sizes of the subsidiaries
and parents.
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Table 2.4: Political giving intensity explained by firm size
total contributions in logs norm.contributions
(1) (2) (3)
subsidiary log revenue 0.09∗ 0.10∗
(0.04) (0.04)
parent log revenue 0.17∗∗∗
(0.05)
subsidiary norm.revenue 0.17∗
(0.07)
parent norm.revenue 0.33∗∗∗
(0.09)
Election Cycle FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry Sector FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 335 319 319
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.30 0.30
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
As shown, the coefficient size of the normalized revenue of the foreign parent is about
twice as big than that of theUS subsidiary; the statistical significance is alsomuch stronger.
In other words, firm size of the foreign parents is a better explanatory variable of the
political giving by foreign-connected PACs than firm size of the US subsidiaries. This
is consistent with the political foreign investment theory, suggesting that the subsidiaries
may go beyond representing their interests in a host country, and represent policy interests
of the foreign parent firms.17
Political intensity reflected by foreign parent firms’ exposure to US policies
Is the outsized PAC giving by domestic subsidiaries of foreign firms associated with
US policies that affect their foreign parent firms? Presumably, foreign parents with strong
trade interests are heavily impacted by US decisions on various trade-related measures
17 In addition, I show in Appendix A2.1 that the size of the headquarters significantly mediates the relation-
ship between foreign ownership and the total amount of political giving by US subsidiaries.
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and policies. Therefore, if domestic subsidiaries engage in federal elections on behalf
of their foreign parent firms, I expect the subsidiaries representing foreign parents with
strong trade interests in the US to give in greater amounts than those with less interests.
In order to test this idea, I collect information about the revealed comparative advan-
tages of the foreign parents’ products against the US from 2013 to 2016, from the theWorld
Bank Group’s World Integrated Trade Solution, as a proxy for the foreign parents’ exports
to the US. I also collect the total number of subsidiaries the foreign parents have in US FTA
partners, as another measure of the firms’ trade interests with the US.
Models (1) and (2) of Table 2.5 test the association between the total amount of foreign-
connected PAC giving and revealed comparative advantage of the foreign parents among
the non-services sectors. The more foreign parents have a relative comparative advan-
tage against American firms, and thus have a greater chance of exporting to the US, the
dollar amount of campaign contributions made by foreign-connected PACs tend to in-
crease. Model (3) shows that the amount of PAC giving scales with the number of global
subsidiaries foreign parents have in US FTA partners.18 Overall, the findings confirm that
domestic subsidiaries of foreign parent firms that are impacted by US policies are the ones
that give more to federal candidates.
More evidence in support of the political foreign investment theory
The political foreign investment theory argues that domestic subsidiaries of foreign
firms play an important political role on behalf of their foreign parents that cannot them-
selves participate in US federal elections. Here I present several pieces of additional evi-
dence that collectively strengthen the theory. I first examine whether the foreign parent
firms actually have strong interests in domestic politics and what those might be; I also
18 I exclude parent firm size from the model because the number of subsidiaries in FTA partners has a rela-
tively high correlation with the size of the foreign parent. The coefficient of the number of subsidiaries is
no longer significant (p>0.05) once I include the measure of parent firm size.
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Table 2.5: Political giving intensity explained by exposure to US policies
total contributions in logs
(1) (2) (3)
subsidiary log revenue 0.16∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.08∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
parent log revenue 0.27∗∗∗
(0.08)
relative comparative advantage 0.38∗∗ 0.28∗
(0.13) (0.12)
subsidiaries in FTA partners 0.19∗∗∗
(0.06)
Election Cycle FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry Sector FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 171 169 333
Adjusted R2 0.33 0.40 0.29
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
gather evidence that the US subsidiaries make political donations with a strong intention
to influence policy making.
If foreign firms have strong political interests in the US as I theorize, I expect to find
them actively engage in other means of political influence at their disposal. I gather in-
formation on whether the subsidiaries in this paper or their foreign parents ever lobbied
since 1998, and if so, what issue areas they have lobbied on. I find that more than 97% of
the foreign firms lobbied the US government, actively on issue areas such as trade/tariff
and foreign relations.19 Given the frequency of foreign firms seeking issue-specific access
to US policymakers, it seems reasonable for the parents to have a longer term US-based
operation that can play a political role on their behalf. Most likely, political giving by
19Across all industries, about 60% of the foreign firms reported at least one lobbying activity concerning
trade issues (e.g., support for US trade agreements, market access to third countries, trade remedy actions,
intellectual property). Meanwhile, about 30% of all foreign firms reported to have lobbied on foreign
relations, such as monitoring bilateral diplomatic/trade relations. I also found foreign firms lobbying
against legislative reforms that might restrict political giving by US subsidiaries of foreign firms.
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foreign-connected PACs and lobbying activities of the foreign firms are coordinated – oth-
erwise, the political efforts of the US subsidiaries would be counter-productive.20
I also collect evidence that the foreign-connected PACs coordinate their activities with
lobbyists. Since the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, any lobby-
ist/registrant PAC – a PAC established or controlled by a lobbyist/registrant – must in-
dicate its status through its Statement of Organization. The lobbyist of such PAC is re-
sponsible for all of the committee’s expenditures and designates where the money goes,
as opposed to providing basic legal and compliance services. Based on the idea that firms
with in-house lobbyists will be the most politically engaged (Lenhard, 2007; Drutman,
2015), I test how the likelihood of foreign-connected PACs compare to that of American
PACs in being lobbyist/registrant PACs. As presented in Appendix Table A2.13, the like-
lihood of being a lobbyist/registrant PAC in fact has a positive and statistically significant
association with foreign ownership. This result is suggestive of US subsidiaries of foreign
firms having strong interests in domestic policy making.
Finally, US subsidiaries of foreign firms with strongmotives to influence domestic pol-
itics are likely to engage in a strategic giving pattern that maximizes political capture. I
expect the subsidiaries to give to both Parties in a relatively balanced manner so that their
favors are well-delivered to both sides, rather than following certain ideological lines. The
US subsidiaries would also give relatively equally to both Chambers so that bills canmove
quickly through Congress when the foreign parent firms demand action. I create two de-
pendent variables to test the idea: relative amount of giving to the Republican Party, and
relative amount of giving to the House, both compared to the total amount of campaign
contributions. Overall, both foreign-connected and American corporate PACs have a ten-
dency to direct their campaign contributions more towards the Republican (vs. Demo-
cratic) Party and the House (vs. Senate). However, as presented in Appendix Table A2.14,
20See Chapter 3 for a detailed analysis of the lobbying activities of foreign multinationals in the US.
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foreign ownership is negatively associated with both measures, indicating that foreign-
connected PACs engage in an even more balanced giving behavior compared to American
PACs. These results collectively provide additional support to the political foreign in-
vestment theory that suggests domestic subsidiaries serve as local political agents of their
foreign parents.
2.5.4 Ruling Out Alternative Mechanisms
Onemight imagine that foreign-connected firmsmust compensate politicians for the same
marginal returns from political investment as native firms. Below, I demonstrate why I
rule out the possibility that such a ’foreignness premium’ might lead to greater political
intensity by the US subsidiaries.
Liability of foreignness
US subsidiaries of foreign firms may face a liability due to their foreignness in polit-
ical participation (Zaheer, 1995; Moeller et al., 2013). Legislators might be wary about
accepting campaign contributions from foreign-connected firms in fear that this would
tarnish their reputation. Then, domestic subsidiaries might have to pay a premium to be
represented. If this were the case, this premium should be highest when firms are from
non-allies of the US. Therefore, I test among the US subsidiaries, whether firms originat-
ing from places that Americans say are “enemies” give more than those from places that
Americans say are “allies.” I use data from the YouGov survey responses conducted be-
tween August 2013 and May 2014, where each country in its sample was ranked from
strongest ally (1st) to strongest enemy (144th). 21
When I plot the home countries of the foreign corporate givers in my data, in Figure
21One of YouGov’s surveys of 1,000 American adults asked “Do you consider the countries listed below
to be a friend or an enemy of the United States?” Respondents could answer “Ally of U.S.,” “Friendly,”
“Unfriendly,” “Enemy of the U.S.” or “Not Sure” for each country listed.
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Figure 2.5: Density of America’s allies and non-allies among foreign-connected givers
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2.5, I find that the bulk of domestic subsidiaries that give campaign contributions through
corporate PACs originate from close allies to start with. This means that the patterns I
find in the main analyses are not driven by non-allies; rather, most of the foreign corpo-
rate giving in the US originate from close allies. Consistent with this, the (common log
transformed) YouGov ally ranking does not have a statistically significant association with
the total amount of giving, as shown in Table 2.6. In fact, the direction of the relationship
does not support the hypothesis that countries perceived to be less friendly givemore than
closer countries in order to compensate for their foreignness. This finding conflicts with
the robust pattern of foreign ownership of a US-based firm having a positive association
with PAC giving.
Political naivete
Domestic subsidiaries of foreign firmsmay try to outbid native firms for representation
because they are relatively new to the US political system and are expected to pay some
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Table 2.6: Political giving intensity & perceived closeness of home country
total contributions in logs
(1) (2)
subsidiary log revenue 0.08∗ 0.09∗
(0.04) (0.04)
parent log revenue 0.15∗∗ 0.15∗∗
(0.05) (0.05)
alliance score −0.03 −0.04
(0.08) (0.08)
Election Cycle FE Yes Yes
Industry Sector FE Yes Yes
State FE No Yes
Observations 308 308
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.31
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
sort of entry fee to be acquainted with politicians. If so, this premium should go down
as experience is accrued; and newer foreign-connected PACs should give more relative
to older ones. To test this idea, I recorded when the foreign-connected PACs were first
established, as a measure of experience. I retrieved this information by finding the initial
year that foreign-connected PACs reported a Statement of Organization to the FEC. I also
collected the number of years that the current US subsidiary of a foreign firm has been
controlling the PAC, since some of the subsidiaries succeeded existing PACs as a result of
cross-border M&A, and have been owners of the PAC for only part of its history.
In Table 2.7, I present the relationship between the age of the foreign-connected PACs
and the total amount of political giving. While the relationship is statistically significant,
the direction is opposite of what the political naivete argument would predict. In fact, the
more experienced foreign-connected PACs tend to give more to federal candidates. I find
similar resultswhen I regress the amount of contributions against the number of years that
US subsidiaries have controlled the corporate PACs. Thus, the lack of experience does not
explain foreign-connected PACs’ intensive political giving.
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Table 2.7: Political giving intensity & political naivete
total contributions in logs
(1) (2)
subsidiary log revenue 0.07 0.08∗
(0.03) (0.04)
parent log revenue 0.10∗ 0.12∗
(0.05) (0.05)
PAC age 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Election Cycle FE Yes Yes
Industry Sector FE Yes Yes
State FE No Yes
Observations 318 318
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.36
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
2.6 Conclusion
There has been a misconception that domestically incorporated foreign firms are indis-
tinguishable from American firms. Based on extensive data collection that allowed me
to distinguish the two groups based on ultimate firm ownership, I analyze the universe
of recent corporate PAC giving – by American and foreign-owned, large and small firms
– and find US subsidiaries of foreign firms to be a distinctive interest group. In fact, US
subsidiaries of foreign firms tend to engage in federal elections more extensively and in-
tensively. Among firms of similar size and parallel business interests, US subsidiaries
of foreign firms are significantly more likely to sponsor a corporate PAC, and they tend
to give a vastly larger amount of campaign contributions than American firms. Indeed,
majority foreign-owned firms in the US accounted for more than 11% of total corporate
campaign contributions while contributing only 5% to private sector GDP in 2015.
I propose a theoretical framework that explains the patterns and motives of political
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giving by these US subsidiaries of foreign firms. Foreign firms have strong policy interests
in theUS because theymust ensure that domestic policies are aligned inways that promote
(and not interfere with) their global operations, and if relevant, help facilitate businesses
of their domestic subsidiaries.22 Since domestically incorporated foreign firms have the
equal opportunity to engage in federal elections, foreign firms may create or utilize ex-
isting domestic subsidiaries so that their interests are represented in the US through the
subsidiaries. The observed outsized political giving by US subsidiaries of foreign firms,
and a variety of supporting evidence illustrated in the paper, corroborate this political
foreign investment theory.
Meanwhile, I rule out alternative explanations for the greater intensity of foreign politi-
cal participation in theUS, such as a ’foreignness premium’ due to a liability of foreignness
or political naivete. Overall, the empirical findings suggest that foreign direct investment
in the US in part serves as an investment in political influence. It is notable that the US is
particularly an important site for global businesses, weighing the relevance of the political
foreign investment theory. Nevertheless, whether the theoretical framework generalizes
to other countries is worth exploring.
The main point of this paper is to highlight that foreign participation in domestic pol-
itics is occurring, and in fact more than what was previously thought. This raises many
questions that are beyond the scope of the current paper. The presence of foreignmultina-
tionals is growing in corporate America and corporate interest groups elsewhere. Given
the trend, should we be concerned about their political participation? Does it change pol-
icy outcomes, and if so, in what ways? What are the implications for other countries with
different degrees of openness to foreign corporate giving? Without answers to these ques-
22A natural extension of this work is to examine lobbying activities of these foreign firms and to understand
how they allocate resources on international issues (presumably concerning mainly the global operations
of a foreign firm) vs. domestic issues (concerning mainly the domestic subsidiaries) depending on firm
characteristics.
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tions, it would be imprudent for policymakers tomake it more difficult for foreign firms to
engage in domestic politics, especially when economic integration is inevitably merging
interests across borders.
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2.7 Appendix: Summary Statistics
Here I provide summary statistics for measures of firm size (operating revenue in the main text;
number of employees in the Appendix for robustness checks) used for the empirical tests. In the
analyses, I use log transformed measures, which significantly reduces the variation in the distri-
bution of firm sizes between American and foreign-owned firms.
Table A2.1: Constructed sample of US-based firms (N=200,000)
firm size: min mean median max sd
Operating revenue (USD)
American 0 21, 564, 768 750, 000 109, 699, 000, 000 677, 070, 397
Foreign-owned 0 234, 722, 902 7, 500, 000 30, 000, 000, 000 1, 525, 330, 330
Operating revenue (USD) in common logs
American 0 6.16 5.88 11.04 0.65
Foreign-owend 0 7.03 6.88 10.48 1.11
Number of employees
American 0 78 7 323, 000 1, 766
Foreign-owned 1 822 35 125, 000 5, 716
Table A2.2: Population of corporate contributors (N=1,636)
firm size: min mean median max sd
Operating Revenue (USD)
American 44, 000 8, 846, 434, 186 1, 728, 722, 000 476, 294, 000, 000 25, 566, 522, 787
Foreign-owned 28, 000 2, 875, 246, 770 880, 672, 000 49, 439, 462, 000 5, 136, 492, 731
Operating Revenue (USD) in common logs
American 4.64 8.96 9.24 11.68 1.23
Foreign-owned 4.45 8.77 8.94 10.69 1.11
Number of employees
American 1 22, 926 3, 500 2, 200, 000 82, 032
Foreign-owned 1 72, 229 3, 500 3, 027, 265 429, 110
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Table A2.3: Final sample (N=201,521)
firm size: min mean median max sd
Operating Revenue (USD)
American 0 76, 367, 864 750, 000 476, 294, 000, 000 2, 278, 734, 758
Foreign-owned 0 790, 860, 560 17, 500, 000 49, 439, 462, 000 2, 912, 438, 812
Operating Revenue (USD) in common logs
American 0 6.18 5.88 11.68 0.69
Foreign-owned 0 7.42 7.24 10.69 1.32
Number of Employees
American 0 207 7 2, 200, 000 6, 884
Foreign-owned 1 6, 509 75 3, 027, 265 122, 866
Notes: The 115 firms among the constructed sample which overlap with the population of corporate contributors were
dropped for the final sample.
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Below I provide summary statistics of the amount of corporate campaign contributions of all cor-
porate PACs in the 2014 and 2016 election cycles. Again, I use log transformed measures in the
main analyses, which significantly reduces the variation in the distribution of firm sizes between
American and foreign-owned firms.
Table A2.4: Population of corporate contributors, 2013-2014 (N=1,422 PACs)
2014 campaign contributions: min mean median max sd
Political giving (USD)
Domestic 50 134, 066 40, 000 2, 985, 103 283, 844
Foreign-owned 500 107, 380 47, 000 1, 478, 750 165, 913
Political giving (USD) in common logs
Domestic 1.71 4.54 4.60 6.47 0.79
Foreign-owned 2.70 4.60 4.67 6.17 0.69
Notes: The 368 PACs that did not give to federal candidates during the 2014 election cycle,
among the 1,768 active PACs were dropped for the analysis.
Table A2.5: Population of corporate contributors, 2015-2016 (N=1,408 PACs)
2016 campaign contributions: min mean median max sd
Political giving (USD)
Domestic 100 141, 671 43, 156 2, 861, 364 289, 725
Foreign-owned 500 112, 207 56, 100 1, 455, 490 168, 426
Political giving (USD) in common logs
Domestic 2.00 4.57 4.64 6.46 0.79
Foreign-owned 2.70 4.64 4.75 6.16 0.68
Notes: The 363 PACs that did not give to federal candidates during the 2016 election cycle,
among the 1,771 active PACs were dropped for the analysis.
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Table A2.6: List of top corporate sponsors (2014 election cycle)
American Foreign-owned
Honeywell International UBS Americas (Switzerland)
AT&T BAE Systems (UK)
Northrop Grumman Zeneca (UK)
Lockheed Martin Anheuser-Busch (Belgium)
The Boeing Company BP Corporation North America (UK)
Comcast Experian North America (UK)
Verizon Communications Sanofi US Services (France)
United Parcel Service Glaxosmithkline LLC (UK)
Raytheon Company Accenture (Ireland)
General Electric Credit Suisse Securities (Switzerland)
The Home Depot Novo Nordisk (Denmark)
Koch Industries BASF (Germany)
United Technologies T-Mobile (Germany)
Exxon Mobil Compass Bancshares (Spain)
CSX Corp DRS Technologies (Italy)
BNSF Railway Oldcastle Materials (Ireland)
Union Pacific Corp Novartis (Switzerland)
AFLAC Bayer (Germany)
Wal-Mart Stores Genentech (Switzerland)
General Dynamics Sprint Communications (Japan)
Table A2.7: List of top corporate sponsors (2016 election cycle)
American Foreign-owned
Honeywell International UBS Americas (Switzerland)
AT&T BASF (Germany)
Lockheed Martin BAE Systems (UK)
Comcast Toyota Motor North America (Japan)
The Boeing Company Anheuser-Busch (Belgium)
Northrop Grumman Experian North America (UK)
United Parcel Service Sanofi US Services (France)
The Home Depot Zeneca (UK)
General Electric Bayer (Germany)
Verizon Communications Novo Nordisk (Denmark)
Raytheon Company Glaxosmithkline LLC (UK)
BNSF Railway T-Mobile (Germany)
Koch Industries BP Corporation North America (UK)
Union Pacific Corp Farmers Group (Switzerland)
Google Genetech (Switzerland)
Exxon Mobil Credit Suisse Securities (Switzerland)
CSX Corp Novartis (Switzerland)
AFLAC Aegon USA (Netherlands)
United Technologies Accenture (Ireland)
General Motors Cemex (Mexico)
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2.8 Appendix: Additional Models
Table A2.8: Alternative tests of the extensive margin of political giving
firm sponsors a PAC or not (0/1)
logistic generalized linear
mixed-effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
foreign ownership 7.41∗∗∗ 8.79∗∗∗ 7.43∗∗∗ 8.70∗∗∗
(0.79) (0.78) (0.52) (0.66)
log revenue 2.41∗∗∗ 2.58∗∗∗ 2.42∗∗∗ 2.57∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
foreign ownership·log revenue −0.65∗∗∗ −0.82∗∗∗ −0.65∗∗∗ −0.81∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.08)
Industry Sector FE Yes Yes
Industry Sector RE Yes Yes
State FE No Yes
State RE No Yes
Observations 174,504 174,097 174,504 174,097
AIC 14,191 13,333 14,263 13,452
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Table A2.9: Extensive margin of political giving (number of employees as measure of firm size)
firm sponsors a PAC or not (0/1)
logistic generalized linear
mixed-effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
foreign ownership 3.98∗∗∗ 4.04∗∗∗ 3.98∗∗∗ 4.02∗∗∗
(0.44) (0.45) (0.45) (0.42)
log employees 2.45∗∗∗ 2.60∗∗∗ 2.45∗∗∗ 2.58∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
foreign ownership·log employees −1.01∗∗∗ −1.06∗∗∗ −1.00∗∗∗ −1.05∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13)
Industry Sector FE Yes Yes
Industry Sector RE Yes Yes
State FE No Yes
State RE No Yes
Observations 162,048 161,857 162,048 161,857
AIC 12,019 11,669 12,101 11,813
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Table A2.10: Alternative tests of the intensive margin of political giving
log amount of contributions by PAC ($)
all givers multinationals only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
foreign ownership 1.76∗∗∗ 1.69∗∗∗ 2.00∗∗∗ 1.98∗∗∗
(0.40) (0.40) (0.44) (0.44)
log revenue 0.30∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
foreign ownership·log revenue −0.19∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Committee RE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Sector RE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State RE No Yes No Yes
Observations 2,608 2,604 1,603 1,603
AIC 4,041 4,022 2,397 2,395
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Table A2.11: Intensive margin of political giving (number of employees as measure of firm size)
log amount of contributions by PAC ($)
all givers multinationals only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
foreign ownership 1.34∗∗∗ 1.27∗∗∗ 1.68∗∗∗ 1.83∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.22)
log employees 0.38∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
foreign ownership·log employees −0.38∗∗∗ −0.38∗∗∗ −0.49∗∗∗ −0.54∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Industry Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,972 1,972 1,201 1,201
Adjusted R2 0.25 0.27 0.24 0.26
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Table A2.12: Two-step hurdle model for political giving
total dollar contributions I(total dollar contributions >0)
hurdle (second-step) logistic (first-step)
(1) (2)
foreign ownership 7.30∗∗∗ 7.41∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.79)
log revenue 0.42∗∗∗ 1.05∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01)
foreign ownership·log revenue −0.34∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.04)
Industry Sector FE Yes Yes
Observations 174,504 174,504
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Here I log transform operating revenue using natural logs (cf. common logs in the rest of the paper)
since the ’pscl’ hurdle model R package log transforms the dependent variable using natural logs.
47
Table A2.13: Likelihood of being a lobbyist/registrant PAC
binary outcome of being a lobbyist/registrant PAC
(1) (2) (3) (4)
foreign ownership 1.26∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗ 1.46∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.21) (0.25) (0.25)
log revenue 0.15∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
foreign ownership·log revenue −0.12∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Election Cycle FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 2,500 2,496 1,554 1,554
AIC 3,236 3,034 2,087 1,997
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Table A2.14: Relative giving to each Party and Chamber
Republican/Total House/Total
(1) (2) (3) (4)
foreign ownership −0.06∗∗∗ −0.02 −0.01 −0.03∗∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
logrev revenue −0.00 −0.00 0.01∗ 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Election Cycle FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 2,588 2,585 2,592 2,588
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.23 0.02 0.07
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
For a few cases in which negative contributions were made (PACs received refunds from federal
candidates), I changed the amount to zero for simplicity of the analysis.
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2.9 Appendix: Artifact of the FECA Rule?
As opposed to American firms, which can establish/sponsor a corporate PAC at both the parent
and subsidiary levels (e.g., Blue Cross Blue Shield headquarters and its state branches, or Berkshire
Hathaway and its sub-units) simultaneously, the FECA only allow US subsidiaries of foreign firms
to participate in federal campaigns. Meanwhile, a PAC established by a parent firm is “affiliated”
with a corporate PACestablished by its subsidiary, and they share a single limit on the contributions
they can make. Thus, one must caution against any dichotomous comparison of political giving at
the individual PAC level, treating all foreign-connected and American PACs separately.
The political concentration of foreign-connected PACs might be an artifact of the FECA law if
the political activities of American PACs tend to be diverted bymultiple affiliated PACs and a ’sub-
stitution bias’ arises (e.g., a foreign-connected PAC giving $10,000 a year would appear to be more
politically intensive on average than a native firm which gives $15,000 through its headquarters
and $2,000 through its subsidiary). To address this, I run alternative tests by aggregating political
giving and firm size by global ultimate ownership (e.g., $10,000 vs. $15,000 + $2,000 = $17,000 in
the example above) and then comparing the political intensity of foreign-originating vs. American
firms (model 1); alternatively I drop all American firms that give through both headquarters and
subsidiaries from the analysis (model 2).
In Table A2.15, firms that give at both levels or only through the subsidiaries are found to give
more than the reference group (GUOs that give only through their headquarters PAC).Meanwhile,
the general relationship between foreign ownership and the total amount of giving, and the inter-
action term remains consistent with the main analyses in Table 2.3 in the main text. Also note that
only for 2.5% of the entire data, firms gave through both headquarters PACs and subsidiary PACs.
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Table A2.15: FECA treatment of affiliated organizations
total contributions in logs
(1) (2)
foreign ownership 1.59∗∗∗ 1.58∗∗∗
(0.37) (0.37)
log revenue (aggregated by GUO) 0.33∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
foreign ownership·log revenue −0.18∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04)
both parent and subsidiary gives 0.46∗∗∗
(0.09)
only subsidiary gives 0.15∗∗
(0.05)
Election Cycle FE Yes Yes
Industry Sector FE Yes Yes
No. Subsidiary FE No Yes
Observations 2,410 2,350
Adjusted R2 0.24 0.22
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Thus, even after dropping all cases in which substitution effect might arise among affiliated
committees (model 2), the patterns remain largely identical, even when controlling for the number
of subsidiary PACs that engage in political giving. Therefore, I confidently reject the speculation
that the political intensity of foreign-connected PACs might be an artifact of the FECA rule.
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2.10 Appendix: Mediation Analysis
Here I demonstrate that the size of the Global Ultimate Owner actually mediates the intensive
political giving by US subsidiaries of foreign firms. I compare among all US-based firms that are
sub-units of either American or foreign GUOs, and analyze the political donations made during
the 2016 election cycle. Following Tingley et al. (2014), I test the Average Causal Mediation Effect
(ACME) of the size of the sponsoring subsidiary’s GUO, and then examine its robustness to the
violation of sequential ignorability due to unobserved pre-treatment cofounders of the mediator
and outcome (Imai, Keele andYamamoto, 2010). I test the following –mediatormodel: size of GUO
∼ foreign ownership + size of subsidiary + industry sector; outcome model: total contributions ∼
size of GUO+ foreign ownership + size of subsidiary + industry sector. Both the quasi-Bayesian
Monte Carlo method and the nonparametric bootstrap simulations (1,000) were used to estimate
the ACME and Average Direct Effect (ADE).
Figure A2.1 presents the estimated ACME under the sequential ignorability assumption, along
with its 95% confidence interval. The differences in the size of the foreign and American parents,
measured in (common log transformed) operating revenue of the headquarters, is positively asso-
ciated with the firms’ level of (common log transformed) political donations, by 0.10 on average
(with a 95% confidence interval of [0.04, 0.17]). This suggests that about 44% of the total effect of
foreign ownership on the level of political giving was transmitted through the size of the GUO.
The sensitivity analysis, presented in Figure A2.2, suggests that the positive mediation effect of
the size of GUO for explaining the effect of foreign ownership on the level of political donation is
moderately robust to possible unobserved pre-treatment confounding. The findings suggest that
foreign ownership is associated with a greater GUO size, leading to more political donations.
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Figure A2.1: Estimated ACME using the size of GUO as mediator
0.0 0.2 0.4
Total
Effect
ADE
ACME
Note: ACME stands for the Average Causal Mediation Effect, also called
the indirect effect. ADE stands for the Average Direct Effect. Together,
they consist the total effect of foreign ownership on the amount of total
giving by US-based subsidiaries.
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Figure A2.2: Sensitivity analysis for using the size of GUO as mediator
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Note: The panels on the top row show the estimated true values of ACMEs as functions of the sensitivity
parameter ρ, which represents the correlation between error terms in the mediation and outcome models.
The thick lines and gray bands represent the point estimates of the ACME and their 95% confidence inter-
vals, respectively. The bottom panels show the same sensitivity analyses, except that the ACME estimates
are plotted against (R˜2Y , R˜2M ), the proportions of the total variance in the outcome and mediator variables,
respectively, that will be explained by a hypothetical unobserved pre-treatment confounder.
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Chapter 3
Foreign Lobbying Through
Domestic Subsidiaries
Abstract
Do foreign firms shape US public policy? I examine this question by documenting for-
eign lobbying through US-based subsidiaries. I identify ownership of all firms that filed
with the domestic Lobbying Disclosure Act, and find that about 20% of US corporate lob-
bying spending represented foreign clients in 2015-2016. 90% of these clients were US
subsidiaries with majority foreign ownership. Supporting the idea that these subsidiaries
act as domestic political agents for their foreign based headquarters, I find foreign-owned
firms to be significantly associated with more lobbying than American multinationals,
controlling for size, industry, and other means of political influence. These subsidiaries
also focus their lobbying efforts on issue areas that critically impact their foreign parents.
The findings suggest that the ForeignAgents RegistrationAct captures only part of foreign
lobbying influence, and that foreign direct investment serves as a means to buy political
influence in America.
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3.1 Introduction
Because Hogan Lovell’s lobbying was done through ZTE’s American entity, its
lobbyists were only required to file disclosures with Congress that revealed
relatively little about their activities. By contrast, companies representing for-
eign clients are required to complete more detailed filings with the Justice De-
partment under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. (“Faced with Crippling
Sanctions, ZTE Loaded Up on Lobbyists,” The New York Times, 2018)
Corporate attempts to shape government policy in ways favorable to the firm are perva-
sive in America (Hillman, Keim and Schuler, 2004). In fact, the reported amount of money
firms spend on lobbying outweighs the amount taxpayers spend to fund all congressional
staff in the House and Senate together (Drutman, 2015). However, despite the rich litera-
ture on corporate America and its lobbying,1 little is known about foreign firm lobbying
in the US. Part of the reason is that the literature on foreign lobbying so far has mainly
focused on the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA),2 when in fact the foreign private
sector can lobby through the domestic lobbying law, the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA).
Not only has foreign lobbying under the LDA been overlooked, but such activities were
further obscured because connection to foreign entities is rarely disclosed under the LDA.
Despite high-profile examples of foreign companies influencing US lawmakers (e.g., Chi-
nese telecommunications companies ZTE or Huawei) through their US entities, and those
practices’ evident threat to American democracy, there has been no systematic studies of
foreign-connected lobbying under the LDA.
This paper answers some of the fundamental questions relating to foreign lobbying
1 See, e.g., Goldstein (1999); Hall and Deardorff (2006); LaPira, Thomas and Baumgartner (2014); Kang
(2016); Kim (2017); Hertel-Fernandez (2017); Bombardini and Trebbi (2019).
2 See, e.g., Jobst (2002); Gawande, Krishna and Robbins (2006); Kee, Olarreaga and Silva (2007); Gawande,
Maloney and Montes Rojas (2009); Montes-Rojas (2018).
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in the US. How much of corporate lobbying filed with the LDA is actually representing
foreign clients? More specifically, to what extent are foreign firms seeking to influence US
policymaking through their US subsidiaries and what are their interests?
Oneway to viewdomestic subsidiaries of foreign firms is to see them just like any other
American firm. Their principal place of business is the US and their interests are as ‘Amer-
ican’ as other domestic firms. This is indeed how domestic subsidiaries of foreign firms
are treated under the LDA. Another approach, however, would be to acknowledge that
domestic subsidiaries are potentially useful political assets for their foreign parents. US
subsidiaries of foreign firms can categorically avoid the onerous FARA and (whether in-
tended or not) obscure foreign ownership under the LDA. This provides strong incentives
for foreign firms to lobby through their US subsidiaries under the LDA.
This latter approach leads to the following empirical implications. I first expect to
identify much foreign-connected lobbying under the LDA through US subsidiaries. Fur-
ther, I expect the subsidiaries to engage in lobbying activities disproportionate to their
economic presence in the US market. This is because the domestic subsidiaries may be
representing the complete set of policy interests (and thus the greater need for lobbying)
of their much larger foreign parents. Therefore, relative to comparable American firms,
and among those that are multinational, I expect domestic subsidiaries of foreign firms
to lobby more often and spend more on lobbying in the US. In addition, I expect these
subsidiaries to lobby on a wider array of issue areas and to focus their lobbying efforts on
issue areas of critical importance to their foreign parents.
To examine these predictions, I assembled an original dataset merging the federal
lobbying activities of all producing firms that lobbied under the LDA during 2015-2016
matched with firm features such as size, industry, location, and global ultimate owner-
ship. I used LobbyView (Kim, 2018) as the basis for identifying firms that lobbied during
the period and their activities. Then, I usedOrbis to identify the country codes of the firms’
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Global Ultimate Owners (with 50.01% or more ownership), which allowed me to separate
American clients from foreign-connected clients based on majority ownership. Perhaps
the central contribution of this work is to use original registration reports to identify the
principal place of business of the foreign clients, and to further distinguish foreign clients
incorporated in the US from those located abroad. Through this process, I identified all
majority foreign-owned domestic subsidiaries filing with the LDA. I also incorporated
data on whether the firms sponsored a Political Action Committee (PAC) during the 2016
election cycle, using previous research on campaign contributions (Chapter 2).
From the data, I first find that US subsidiaries of foreign firms in fact account for 90%
of all foreign-connected lobbying spending reported under the LDA. Only 10% of foreign
commercial lobbying represents foreign firms based abroad – whether they have sub-
sidiaries in the US or not. This suggests that much of the lobbying by US subsidiaries
is likely to represent interests of the many foreign multinational corporations with high
stakes in US policies. To better understand their behavior, I analyze two patterns of lob-
bying by the US subsidiaries of foreign multinationals: the decision to lobby and intensity
of lobbying. Using similarly sized American firms as a reference group, I find foreign-
ownership of domestic firms to have a positive and significant association with both the
likelihood of engaging in lobbying activities and the amount of spending. This holds true
among a sub-sample of multinational firms, and controlling for industry, location, and
other means of political influence (PAC activities). Overall, majority foreign-owned do-
mestic subsidiaries account for about 17% of total corporate lobbying spending in the US
(and nearly 22% of corporate lobbying spending by multinational firms in the US), dis-
proportionate to their contributions to the US private sector GDP, close to 5%.
I findmultiple evidence points for the most plausible explanation for this relatively in-
tensive lobbying by the US subsidiaries – that they represent the interests of their foreign
multinational parents. First, I demonstrate that US subsidiaries of foreign firms generally
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lobby on a broader array of issue areas than comparable American multinationals. I also
find that the subsidiaries spend disproportionately on issue areas of interest to their for-
eign parents – collectively as a group and also at the firm level. For instance, domestic
subsidiaries of foreign firms spend 8% of their total lobbying expenses on trade issues,
compared to American firms, which spend 5%. Likewise, foreign ownership of US-based
firms has a positive and significant associationwith both the amount of lobbying spending
and the count of lobbying reports filed regarding trade/tariff and foreign relations issues
after controlling for firm characteristics. Also, US subsidiaries of foreign firms lobby in-
tensively on industry-specific issue codes where a lot of foreign investment into the US is
concentrated, and where scrutiny for investment is high. Examples include the pharma-
ceutical, telecommunications, transportation, and defense industries.
This paper therefore contributes to the growing body of firm-level theories of inter-
national political economy (Bombardini, 2008; Kim, 2017; Osgood et al., 2017) by inves-
tigating how foreign firms engage in US policy making processes in an integrated global
economy. For the first time, I systematically identify and analyze foreign-connected lobby-
ing under the LDA, contributing to the literature on corporate political activities (Hillman,
Keim and Schuler, 2004; Lux, Crook and Woehr, 2011; Bombardini and Trebbi, 2019), and
foreign lobbying specifically. I also build on the literature on interest group politics more
generally and demonstrate how current policymaking processes in the US may actually
allow foreign intervention through the growing presence of domestically incorporated
foreign firms.
3.2 Theory of ForeignLobbying throughDomestic Subsidiaries
Lobbying is an integral part of lawmaking process in the United States. Firms, as active
participants, communicate their corporate priorities to policymakers through lobbyists
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that facilitate information flows between the private and public sectors (Hall and Dear-
dorff, 2006). Since the enactment of the Lobbying Disclosure Act, which aimed to bring
increased accountability to federal lobbying practices in the US, corporate lobbying has
been relatively well documented and studied. However, a big unresolved question is to
what extent foreign-connected lobbying takes place under the LDA, and how lobbying by
foreign-connected firms compare to that of American firms.
In the following, I explain the general framework for foreign lobbying in the US and
point to gaps in the literature that suggest that foreign corporate lobbying in the US has
been only partially understood. This calls for a need to redirect our focus to foreign lob-
bying through domestic subsidiaries under the LDA.
3.2.1 Foreign Corporate Lobbying in the US
Foreign principals – a foreign government or foreign political party; a foreign person; or
a combination of persons organized under the law or having its principal place of busi-
ness in a foreign country – can legally hire ‘foreign agents’ to influence the US government
as long as these agents register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. With the en-
actment of the Lobbying Disclosure Act in 1995, FARA was amended to exempt foreign
commercial entities from registering and disclosing their activities under FARA. Under this
exemption, lobbyists for foreign firms, whose US advocacy is not directed or conducted on
behalf of a foreign government, were allowed to disclose their work in the samemanner as
domestic firms under the LDA. This reformwas significant for foreign firms and lobbyists
representing them, because it is prudent for them to avail themselves of this exemption to
the FARA registration, which is an onerous and stigmatized process.3 The LDA has been
3 The financial disclosure requirements are considerably more extensive under FARA than under the LDA.
Under the LDA , a lobbyist only has to file a semi-annual report that contains his/her name, a short de-
scription of the general issue area on behalf of the firm for which they are lobbying, and a good faith
estimate of the total amount of income received and expenses on behalf of the client. FARA, on the other
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preferred to the extent that foreign firms would voluntarily register under the LDA rather
than take the risk of subjecting themselves to FARA, even though firms are not required
to disclose their activities if they do not meet a minimum expenditure threshold.
And yet, the literature on foreign lobbying (Jobst, 2002; Gawande, Krishna and Rob-
bins, 2006; Kee, Olarreaga and Silva, 2007; Gawande, Maloney and Montes Rojas, 2009;
Montes-Rojas, 2018) and related data collection efforts (e.g., Foreign Lobby Watch by the
Center for Responsive Politics and the Foreign Lobbyist Influence Tracker, a joint project
of ProPublica and the Sunlight Foundation) so far have been overwhelmingly focused on
FARA. As a result, our understanding of foreign corporate lobbying has been inadequate
and partial. Moreover, the practice of foreign lobbying through domestic subsidiaries
has been completely overlooked, as even before the LDA, domestic subsidiaries of foreign
firms never fell under the purview of FARA, because they are “organized under or created
by the laws of the United States or of any State or other place subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States” (U.S.C. §611(b)(2)).
With the intense attention drawn to FARA as part of Mueller’s investigation into Rus-
sian interference in the 2016 election, there has been Congressional movement to revise
the statute significantly, including reversing the 1995 decision to remove the private sec-
tor from FARA and place it instead under the LDA.4 More than ever it is important to
understand foreign lobbying under domestic laws. In this paper, I examine all lobbying
reports filed under the LDA in 2015-2016 and identify corporate clients with majority for-
eign ownership. I further distinguish whether the clients are domestically incorporated
hand, requires disclosure of more than just lobbying, including advisory services and public relations,
regular updates of activities to the Department of Justice, detailed lists of activities, an itemized account
of expenditures, and copies of all oral or written agreements. Further, violations of the LDA for failure to
file or for fraudulent filings are punishable by civil penalties as opposed to FARA’s criminal penalties.
4 See , e.g., “Manafort case puts new scrutiny on foreign lobbying law’s shortcomings” (LaFraniere, 2018)
or “How Mueller revived a law that protects us all against foreign money” (Teachout, 2019). Senator
Grassley (R-IA) has been pushing for repeal of the LDA exemption. Explicitly, US subsidiaries of foreign
headquartered businesses would no longer be able to register under the LDA.
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foreign firms with majority foreign ownership or foreign firms based abroad. The paper
thus sheds light on how much of foreign lobbying has been underestimated by overlook-
ing the LDA channel, and highlights the political role that US subsidiaries of foreign firms
may play under the current system.
3.2.2 Lobbying by Domestic Subsidiaries of Foreign Firms
Recall that all foreign commercial entities can lobby and disclose their activities under
the domestic Lobbying Disclosure Act since 1995.5 This includes domestic subsidiaries
of foreign multinationals (that were already exempted from FARA) but also the foreign
parents themselves based abroad. Therefore, US subsidiaries of foreign multinationals
always have a choice of hiring lobbyists to represent either their own interests or the col-
lective interests of the entire corporate group. For instance, Texas-incorporated ZTE USA,
a wholly owned subsidiary of Shenzen-based Chinese ZTE Corp, could lobby on issue
areas that affect them as a domestic entity (knowing that the parent ZTE Corp could hire
separate lobbyists if it wanted to), or ZTE USA could seek advocacy on issue areas that
affect both its US operations and those of its Chinese parent. Therefore, there are two
ways to view the lobbying activities of domestic subsidiaries of foreign firms. The first
view captures the premise of the LDA regarding domestic subsidiaries of foreign firms;
the latter is unique to the argument of this paper.
Theory 1: Subsidiaries represent their own interests
One theory is that domestic subsidiaries engage in lobbying activities on their own behalf
(only). Their principal place of business is the US and their interests are as ‘American’
as any domestic firms. Then the subsidiaries’ lobbying patterns are expected to be deter-
mined by ordinary features documented in the corporate political activities literature con-
5 Compare this with the Federal Election Campaign Act that bans foreign firms from making political do-
nations, unless they are domestically incorporated (Powell, 1996).
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cerning domestic firms such as size, government regulations, sales to the government, and
location (Wright, 1989; Mitchell, Hansen and Jepsen, 1997; Ansolabehere, De Figueiredo
and Snyder Jr., 2003; Drope and Hansen, 2006). Controlling for these determinants, for-
eign ownership should not be a factor that distinguishes the lobbying activities of US
subsidiaries from the rest of corporate America. Moreover, the lobbying patterns of US
subsidiaries of foreign firms should not be significantly different from those of American
multinational corporations.
Theory 2: Subsidiaries represent their parents’ interests
Another theory is that foreign multinationals lobby through their domestic subsidiaries
in the US, and therefore, domestic subsidiaries lobby on behalf of their US operations
and foreign parents. Then the US subsidiaries’ lobbying patterns are no longer expected
to be indistinguishable from American firms. Now the US subsidiaries represent inter-
ests of their much larger parent firms, which are also multinational. Recent studies find
that multinational corporations are both economically and politically the most influential
firms in today’s global economy (Rodrik, 2018; Kim and Milner, 2019). With their con-
centrated economic resources, multinationals can easily lobby for their preferred policies
and are capable of internalizing the benefits of successful political action (Johns, Pelc and
Wellhausen, 2019). Domestic subsidiaries are thus expected to feature distinct patterns of
lobbying, which are characteristic of their multinational, andmuch larger foreign parents.
The two competing views lead to different empirical implications for the impact of
foreign ownership on firms’ quantity (decision to lobby and intensity of lobbying) and
quality (scope and issue selection) of lobbying as below.
Decision to lobby & intensity of lobbying The literature finds firm size to be an important
determinant of corporate political engagement. Large firms tend to have more policy in-
terests and the ability to engage in political activities. Therefore, if domestic subsidiaries
63
lobby on behalf of the policy interests of their US operations only (Theory 1), their lob-
bying activities will tend to increase proportionate to the size of their US establishments.
Importantly, this tendency would be in par with other American firms. Similarly sized
American firms and US subsidiaries of foreign firms should show similar lobbying pat-
terns, controlling for other determinants of firm lobbying such as industry and location.
However, if very large foreign multinationals lobby through their domestic subsidiaries
(Theory 2), the subsidiaries must lobby on behalf of the complete set of policy interests of
their US and global operations. Then the lobbying patterns of domestic subsidiaries are
not necessarily determined by the size of the US establishments. In fact, some subsidiaries
might be among the firms that lobby the most, even though they do not necessarily have
the largest presence in the US.
In order to test these theoretical expectations, I test two patterns of corporate lobbying
– at the extensive margin, the likelihood of a firm to engage in lobbying, and at the inten-
sive margin, how much a firm spends on lobbying once they engage in lobbying. Since
I am interested in the role of foreign-ownership of domestic firms, I limit my analysis to
corporate clients located in the US. If consistent with Theory 1, there shouldn’t be a sig-
nificant difference between foreign-owned and American firms in their decision to lobby
and intensity of lobbying. The relationship between firm size and these lobbying patterns
should also be indistinguishable between the two groups of firms. On the other hand,
if consistent with Theory 2, I expect majority foreign-owned domestic subsidiaries to be
associated with a greater likelihood of lobbying, and also greater spending than similarly
sized American firms (in general and among multinational firms). Foreign-ownership is
therefore expected to moderate the relationship between firms’ size in the US and their
quantity of lobbying.
Scope of lobbying& issue selection of lobbyingAnotherway to analyze the lobbying pattern
of the two groups is to look at the subject matter that they lobby on. In lobbying reports,
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registrants select (as many as necessary) categories from a list of 79 issue codes to reflect
all actual and anticipated lobbying activities. I therefore kept track of the issue codes that
were lobbied on behalf of the US subsidiaries of foreign firms and compared them with
the reported issue codes for American clients at the firm level. If foreign-ownership does
not distinguish domestic subsidiaries fromAmerican firms (Theory 1), those located in the
same industry and location should lobby alike in terms of the issue codes that they care
about. The scope of lobbying should be similar and as well as the focus of lobbying among
the two group of firms. However, if domestic subsidiaries of foreign firms represent the
complete set of policy interests of the US and foreign operations (Theory 2), I expect the
subsidiaries to lobby on a greater variety of issue codes than comparable American firms
and to lobby on issue areas that clearly benefit the foreign parents.
For instance, multinational firms are known to be the strongest supporters of trade lib-
eralization, due to the concentrated gains from trade (Osgood et al., 2017; Huneeus and
Kim, 2018). Therefore the US subsidiaries are expected to lobby intensively on trade is-
sues, and foreign relations, more generally, so that the foreign parents’ businesseswith the
US (or third countries through the US) are good.6 Meanwhile, America’s robust intellec-
tual property (IP) laws have often put strain onUS relations with trading partners; and the
foreign multinationals’ IP must be separately registered in the US for protection in the do-
mestic market. Therefore the difficulties faced by foreign firms in creating regulatory co-
herency may cause the subsidiaries to lobby intensively on copyright/patent/trademark
issues (Smith, 2001; Faunce, 2006). Finally, if domestic subsidiaries were to represent their
6 Unfortunately, the typology of the general issue codes makes it difficult to make predictions on which
codes might be more relevant to subsidiaries vs. parents or even domestic vs. international firms. For
instance TRD (trade) encompasses both “domestic & foreign trade” issues; there are separate codes for
GOV (government issues) and FOR (foreign relations); meanwhile, there are separate codes for MAN
(manufacturing), CHM (chemicals/chemicals industry), and PHA (pharmacy) even though one could
argue that chemicals fall under the manufacturing sector and pharmaceutical manufacturing falls under
chemicals. However, it is safe to assume that TRD (trade) or TAR (miscellaneous tariff bill) would be a
critical issue code for domestic subsidiaries that represent their foreign multinationals.
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foreign parents’ interests, their lobbying efforts would be focused on issue areas which
affect foreign investment in the US. Specifically, I expect to find concentrated lobbying
on industry-specific issue codes where a lot of foreign investment occurs (e.g., pharmacy,
transportation), or where foreign investment is highly regulated by the Committee on For-
eign Investment in the United States (e.g., telecommunications, defense).7
3.3 The Data
I assembled a dataset merging the lobbying activities of all firms that lobbied during 2015-
2016 (2016 election cycle) matched with firm and industry characteristics. As the basis
of corporate lobbying data, I used LobbyView (Kim, 2018), a firm-level lobbying & con-
gressional bills database based on original lobbying reports.8 In order to investigate firm
lobbying by issue areas, I first queried lobbying data at the report level that contains the
name of the represented client and its registrant, the total lobbying income/expenses, and
issue codes reflecting the general issue areas in which the registrant engaged in lobbying
on behalf of the client. I divided the total lobbying spending in each report by the number
of general issue codes indicated in it to derive how much was spent on each issue area.
Then, I aggregated the lobbying amount for all issue codes over the two years for each
client, so as to change the unit of analysis to the firm level.
One of the biggest advantages of using LobbyViewwas its readily available Orbis firm
identifiers, Bureau Van Dijik IDs (Bvd IDs), assigned to each client. Using this as my basis,
I made substantial improvements to the Bvd IDs in ways suitable for this paper. For in-
stance, here it is critical to distinguish foreign clients based abroad from foreign-connected
7 See recent developments surrounding the Foreign Investment Risk ReviewModernization Act (FIRRMA)
to expand jurisdiction of the CFIUS to conduct national security reviews of a wide-range of transactions
involving foreign investment in US technology, infrastructure and data businesses.
8 The data were downloaded in March 2020 using LobbyView’s application program interface (API).
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clients based in the US. Therefore, I revisited all the Bvd IDs with foreign country codes
by reading through original registration reports made on behalf of the clients. Based on
the reported street address of the ‘principal place of business’ of each of these clients, I
updated the Bvd IDs for cases in which the US establishments of foreign owners engaged
in lobbying. I ended up changing 36% of the foreign clients’ Bvd IDs. In addition, I sub-
stantially updated the LobbyView Bvd IDs that were outdated. For the empirical tests, I
eliminated a large amount of non-firm producers – government districts and agencies, as-
sociations, nonprofit organizations included in LobbyView – based on names and industry
classifications.
Using the updated Bvd IDs of the clients, I then downloaded andmatchedmeasures of
firm and industry features with firms’ lobbying data. These include firm size (operating
revenue), 4-digit core NAICS codes, location, and Global Ultimate Owner (GUO; with at
least 50.01% ownership).9 I used the country code of the identified GUOs to create my
main variable of interest – foreign ownership, with 1 standing for majority foreign-owned
domestic firms and 0 for American firms. Since firm ownership could vary over time,
I used secondary ownership information based on internet research and foreign owner-
ship information (when available) in the lobbying registration reports around 2015-2016
to make sure that the foreign ownership variable is accurate. In a sub-sample analysis, I
check whether American firms (themselves or their GUOs) have at least one subsidiary
outside of the US to identify American multinationals as a closer reference group to the
US subsidiaries of foreign firms.
Finally, I merge the above with original data on corporate Political Action Committee
(PAC) sponsorship and the amount of campaign contributions given by these PACs to fed-
eral candidates during the 2016 election cycle (Chapter 2). This information serves two
9 For the measure of firm size, I use the average operating revenue of firms in 2015 and 2016, and impute
the latest year value available if missing. However, Orbis still lacks financial data for a lot of the smaller
or private firms. Thus, I used a secondary resource, D&B Hoovers, to collect firm revenue for these firms.
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purposes. First, this controls for an alternative means of political influence by all firms –
helping eliminate the possibility of substitution between lobbying and campaign finance.
Secondly, in another sub-sample analysis, using only US subsidiaries of foreign firms, I
compare themagnitude of lobbying activities between domestic subsidiarieswith foreign-
connected PACs and those without, to highlight the political role of domestic subsidiaries
in the US.
Overall, the various interests of 5768 firms were disclosed during 2015-2016 under the
Lobbying Disclosure Act. Among these firms, 5148 were located in the US, consisting of
4657 American and 491 majority foreign-owned firms, which are the focus of this study.10
TheUS subsidiaries of foreign firms, while consisting only 9.5% in number of all firms that
lobbied in the US, accounted for about 17% ($750 million over the two years) of the total
corporate lobbying spending by ‘US’ clients. This amount is greater than eight times the
spending by foreign firms located abroad. In fact, most of the foreign-connected lobbying
activities (nearly 90%) under the LDA are practiced in the US and not from overseas.
3.4 Empirical Tests and Results
In order to understand how actively US subsidiaries of foreign firms engage in lobbying
activities in the US, I use American firms with similar features – size, industry, location
– as a reference group and test their political engagement at two different levels: 1) the
likelihood of engaging in lobbying activities, and 2) the level of income/expenses relating
to their lobbying activities in 2015 and 2016.
10588 foreign-based firms and 31 foreign firms with US ultimate owners are excluded from the analysis.
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3.4.1 Extensive Margin: The Likelihood of Lobbying
Testing the firms’ likelihood of lobbying requires constructing a representative sample
of US firms from its population. I use Orbis to draw a random sample of 100,000 goods-
producing firms (2-digit NAICS 11, 21, 31-33) and of 100,000 services firms (2-digit NAICS
22, 23, 42-81).11 The 5148 US-based clients were added to this sample. After dropping the
347 firms that overlap with the random sample that I constructed, I had a final sample of
204,802 firms. For all firms in the final sample, I downloaded firm and industry informa-
tion from Orbis. Again, a foreign ownership variable was created for all firms based on
the country codes of their GUO.
Regression Analysis for the Likelihood of Corporate Lobbying
I infer the likelihood of corporate lobbying for the final sample of firms using a condi-
tional logistic regressionmodel.12 For the binary outcome variable of corporate lobbying, I
assigned 1 to all firms that lobbied in 2015-2016 and 0 to the remaining. The likelihood that
a firm engages in lobbying activities is explained by the size of its US operation (measured
in common log transformed operating revenue), foreign ownership, and an interaction
term of these two variables. The interaction term represents the idea that US subsidiaries
of foreign firms are less likely to reflect the size of the US establishment, as they are ex-
pected to lobby on behalf of their foreign parent firms as well. Finally I stratify the sample
by industry sectors and the states in which the firms are located. This allowsme to control
for other determinants of lobbying, while testing whether foreign-owned firms engage in
lobbying activities disproportionate to similarly sized American firms.
11This sample was drawn in March 2020, and is original to this paper. Half of the firms are drawn from the
‘very large,’ ‘large,’ and ‘medium’ firm size categories, and the other half are drawn from ‘small’ firms.
12 In the analysis, I weighted each firm in the sample by the number of actual firms in the population of each
subgroup. The value 1 was assigned to all firms that engaged in lobbying activities. Meanwhile, the actual
number of firms in the different categories (goods-producing vs. services and small vs. non-small) was
divided by the number of draws incorporating the overlaps, and assigned to the other firms.
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Table 3.1: Extensive margin of lobbying
binary outcome of lobbying
(1) (2)
foreign ownership 7.88∗∗∗ 7.86∗∗∗
(0.30) (0.32)
log revenue 2.10∗∗∗ 2.01∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
foreign ownership·log revenue −0.75∗∗∗ −0.76∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04)
Industry strata Yes Yes
State strata Yes Yes
PAC strata No Yes
Observations 203,759 203,759
Max. Possible R2 0.40 0.36
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table 3.1 summarizes the result of the conditional logistic regression model. The for-
eign ownership variable is positive and statistically significant. Firm size also has a gen-
eral positive association with the likelihood of corporate lobbying for both American and
foreign-owned firms. However, as indicated by the negative interaction term, US sub-
sidiaries of foreign firms’ chance of lobbying has a smaller association with firm size in
the US. As the foreign ownership coefficient is much larger than the interaction coefficient,
the models suggest that majority foreign-owned firms in the US are more likely to engage
in lobbying compared to similarly sized American firms.
This relationship is presented in Figure 3.1 where I plot the predicted probability of
lobbying with 95% confidence intervals. For most firm sizes, the predicted probability of
lobbying is significantly greater for foreign-owned firms. At the 25th quantile of firm size,
foreign-owned firms are predicted to have a fortyfold greater likelihood of lobbying than
American firms; by thirtyfold at the 50th quantile (at about $1 million in operating rev-
enue); and by twentyfold at the 75th quantile. Note that 99.7%of firms in the sample gener-
ate less than $186million in annual operating revenue; and the largest foreign-owned firm
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Figure 3.1: Predicted probability of lobbying by firm size and ownership
in the sample ($56 billion in operating revenue) is smaller than the hypothetical threshold
($80 billion in operating revenue) by which American firms start having a significantly
greater chance of lobbying.
In model (2) of Table 3.1, I further stratify the sample based on whether firms in the
sample sponsored a corporate PAC during the 2016 election cycle or not. As shown, the re-
lationship between the likelihood of corporate lobbying, firm size, and foreign ownership
remains the same even after controlling for the firm’s engagement in alternative means of
political activities. This rules out an alternative explanation that the the greater likelihood
of lobbying may be due to lacking other means of influencing policies.13
13Rather, firms that sponsored a PAC during the election cycle actually were associated with a greater likeli-
hood of lobbying in those years. See Appendix Table A3.1 for an alternative conditional logistic regression
model which includes an indicator variable for PAC giving in the model rather than stratifying the sample
based on it.
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3.4.2 Intensive Margin: The Level of Lobbying Spending
Here I examine the dollar amount of spending relating to corporate lobbying activities
during 2015-2016. I use ‘lobbying spending’ either to refer to the lobbying income that
outside registrants make from their corporate clients or to the lobbying expenses accrued
to the clients frompaying in-house lobbyists. Having established that foreign-ownedfirms
in the US are generally more likely to lobby than comparable American firms, I now test
among the firms that lobbied – at the intensive margin – whether foreign ownership is
associated with more lobbying spending.
Regression Analysis for the Total Amount of Corporate Lobbying Spending
I test the dollar amount of lobbying spending using an ordinary least square regression
model with fixed effects. The total amount of (common log transformed) lobbying spend-
ing is again regressed against the size of the firm (measured in common log transformed
operating revenue), foreign ownership, and an interaction term of the two, which allows
foreign ownership tomoderate the relationship between corporate lobbying spending and
firm size as before. Similar to above, I include industry sector and state fixed effects.
Models (1) to (2) of Table 3.2 examine the relationship between corporate lobbying
spending, foreign ownership, and firm size among all firms that lobbied in 2015-2016.
Foreign ownership is again positive and statistically significant across all models. The size
of the US-based firms also has a strong positive association with the amount of lobbying
spending, but less so in degree for the US subsidiaries of foreign firms. These patterns
are visualized in Figure 3.2 which show the significantly different slopes that American
and foreign-owned firms have for firm size and lobbying spending. The red line that
summarizes the relationship for foreign-owned firms is significantly flatter and higher
than the grey line representing American firms. Overall, US subsidiaries of foreign firms
tend to spend more on lobbying than similarly sized American firms. For instance, at the
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Table 3.2: Intensive margin of lobbying
total lobbying spending in logs
all firms multinational firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
foreign ownership 2.35∗∗∗ 2.17∗∗∗ 1.84∗∗ 1.28∗
(0.62) (0.60) (0.65) (0.62)
log revenue 0.49∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
foreign ownership·log revenue −0.24∗∗ −0.23∗∗ −0.21∗∗ −0.15∗
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
log PAC contributions 0.27∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,932 4,932 1,577 1,577
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.16 0.12 0.21
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
25th quantile of firm size, foreign-owned firms are predicted to spend about 9 times more
than American firms; 3.5 timesmore at the 50th quantile (at about $20million in operating
revenue); and 83% more at the 75th quantile.
In models (3) and (4) of Table 3.2, I conduct a sub-sample analysis among multina-
tional firms only, including all US subsidiaries of foreign firms and American firms that
are either multinational themselves or are owned by another American multinational cor-
poration. The purpose is to make the reference American group even more similar to the
US subsidiaries of foreign firms and thus rule out the possibility that the findings in (1)
and (2) are simply due to the multinational characteristics of the domestic subsidiaries.
As shown, among multinational corporations, foreign-ownership still has a positive and
significant association with lobbying spending. This finding strongly suggests that the US
subsidiaries, unlike American firms, may lobby on behalf of their parents.
Finally, note that the above relationships hold when controlling for PAC activities. In
models (2) and (4) I include the (common log transformed) dollar amount of PAC contri-
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Figure 3.2: Dollar amount of lobbying spending by firm size and ownership
bution made by the firms. As shown, firms that gave more to federal candidates through
their corporate PACs during the period were also associated with a greater amount of
lobbying spending.
In Appendix A3.2, I conduct a two-step hurdle model that links the extensive and in-
tensive margin analyses. The first zero-count process of the model examines firms’ like-
lihood of lobbying (using a binary logistic regression model) based on the final sample
used in this paper; the second positive-count process examines the amount of lobbying
spending made by these firms (using a negative binomial model). The results of the two-
step model are consistent with those in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. This rules out the odds that
the intensive margin results are biased, driven by the possibility that firms that chose to
engage in lobbying are significantly different from others in the final sample.
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Table 3.3: Variety of lobbying issue areas
Unique issue areas lobbied
all firms multinational firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
foreign ownership 0.25∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10)
log revenue 0.08∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
foreign ownership·log revenue −0.02∗ −0.02∗ −0.06∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
log PAC contributions 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,932 4,932 1,577 1,577
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.25 0.21 0.34
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
3.4.3 Lobbying Issue Areas
Earlier I posited that the scope of lobbying by US subsidiaries of foreign firms may be
larger than that of American firms, as the subsidiaries may need to represent the interests
of their own operations in the US and also interests of their foreign parents. In Table
3.3, I find evidence that foreign ownership of a US-based firm has a significant positive
association with the total number of unique issue codes it lobbied on in 2015-2016. This is
true among similarly sized multinational firms located in the same industry and state, as
shown in models (3) and (4). It is plausible that US subsidiaries lobby on a significantly
greater number of unique issue areas, relative to comparable American firms, due to their
need to lobby on behalf of the broad policy interests of their foreignmultinational parents.
Nowwhich issue areas are the US subsidiaries particularly interested in, and how does
their lobbying focus differ from American firms? If foreign multinationals lobby through
their domestic subsidiaries, I expect that the US subsidiaries as a group lobby intensively
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on international issue codes such as trade/tariff and foreign relations; I also expect the
subsidiaries to lobby intensively on certain industry-specific issue codes where FDI into
the US is particularly concentrated or regulated. As a first step for understanding these
questions, I computed howmuch American and foreign-owned firms spent on all 79 issue
codes in 2015-2016.14
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 representword clouds based on the total amount of lobbying spend-
ing by American and foreign-owned firms on each issue code. Effectively, the issue code
text sizes are determined based on the dollar spending on each issue code relative to all
others. This way, I can compare the importance of each issue code among American and
foreign-owned firms in a normalized way. For both American firms and foreign-owned
firms, TAX (taxation/internal revenue code) is the issue codewith highest lobbying spend-
ing. Meanwhile, TRD (trade), HCR (health issues), TEC (telecommunications) are some
issue codes where US subsidiaries of foreign firms noticeably concentrate on, compared
to American firms. In Appendix Figures A3.1 and A3.2, I present parallel word clouds of
American multinational firms and the US subsidiaries of foreign firms. The differences in
the emphasis on certain issue codes between this sub-group of American multinationals
and US subsidiaries of foreign firms appear to be even greater.
I highlight the comparison in Figure 3.5 where I present the differences in percentage
spending on issue codes by the two firm groups (foreign-owned vs. American). The fig-
ure lists the top 10 issue codes on which foreign-owned firms report higher percentage
spending than American firms. The dumbbell corresponding to each lobbying issue code
indicates the percentage spending by all US subsidiaries of foreign firms (on the right end)
and American firms (on the left end).
As expected, trade is the issue area where the percentage spending difference is the
greatest between US subsidiaries of foreign firms and American firms – US subsidiaries
14See Appendix Table A3.5 for the complete list of lobbying issue codes filed under the LDA.
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Figure 3.3: Word cloud of American firms
Tax
Health
Trade
Medicare
Budget
Copyright
Telecom
Defense
Energy
Transportation
Financial Inst.
Pharmacy
Environment
SecurityAgriculture
Automotive
Insurance
Education
Consumer
Banking
n.a.
Government
Aviation
Foreign Relations
Labor
Chemicals
Marine
Fuel
Natural Resources
Manufacturing
Alcohol Food
Tariff
Immigration
Science
Beverage
Communications
Veterans
Trucking
Retirement
Aerospace
Accounting
Air & Water
Economics Utilities
Law Enf.
Medical
Railroads
Tobacco
Intelligence
Figure 3.4: Word cloud of foreign-owned firms
77
7.1
5.1
4.5
3.8
3.7
3
2.8
0.9
0.3
0.3
9.1
7.8
5.6
4.4
5.1
3.8
5.1
2.5
0.9
1.5
Defense
Marine/Maritime
Transportation
Medicare/Medicaid
Automotive Industry
Copyright/Patent/Trademark
Pharmacy
Health Issues
Telecommunications
Trade
0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5
Percentage spending on issue codes
Figure 3.5: Top 10 issue codes on which foreign-owned firms report higher percentage spending
devoted about 8% of their total lobbying spending on trade issues compared to 5% by
American firms.15 This finding also holds at the individual firm level. In Appendix Table
A3.3, I show that foreign ownership of US-based multinational firms has a positive signif-
icant association with both firm lobbying spending and the count of lobbying reports on
trade and tariff issues.
Meanwhile, I do not find foreign relations to be an issue code where US subsidiaries
of foreign firms, as a group, particularly concentrate their efforts under the LDA. Both US
subsidiaries of foreign firms andAmerican firms allocated about 1% of their total lobbying
spending on the foreign relations issue code. It is also expected that foreign clients’ foreign
relations concerns would be filed with the FARA through non-commercial foreign agents
like government agencies and parties. However at the firm level, controlling for size and
other characteristics, I do find foreign-ownership to have a positive significant relationship
15Similarly, US subsidiaries of foreign firms spent 0.6% on TAR (miscellaneous tariff bill) whereas American
firms spent 0.2%.
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with the amount of lobbying spending on foreign relations issues and the count of reports
regarding them (see Appendix Table A3.4) among US-based multinationals.
Among industry-specific issue codes, health issues, pharmacy, andMedicaid/Medicare
are where US subsidiaries focus much of their lobbying efforts. These are the exact ar-
eas where foreign direct investment in the US (FDIUS) is concentrated. According to the
Bureau of Economic Analysis, the single 4-digit NAICS industry code with the largest
amount of FDI into the US (14.2% of all FDIUS, 78% of FDIUS in chemicals, and 35% of
FDIUS in the manufacturing sector in 2016) is 3254, pharmaceutical and medicine manu-
facturing. Rich anecdotal evidence talks to how the multinational pharmaceutical compa-
nies’ pricing and sales are significantly impacted by domestic policy and regulations, and
the foreign multinationals’ need for lobbying.16 Meanwhile, NAICS codes with the sec-
ond largest FDI into the US are motor vehicle manufacturing (3361), motor vehicle body
and trailer manufacturing (3362), and motor vehicle parts manufacturing (3363), together
consisting 78% of investment in transportation equipment. Percentage lobbying spending
in these areas (automotive industry and transportation each ranked 6th and 8th in Figure
3.5) are also greater among US subsidiaries of foreign firms.
The domestic subsidiaries’ lobbying emphasis on telecommunications is not a sur-
prise considering the strengthened Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
(CFIUS) laws targeting “critical” technology and infrastructure. As the CFIUS’s security
concerns about the telecommunications sector grew, President Trump recently issued an
executive order to establish the “Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in
the United States Telecommunications Services Sector.” More traditionally, CFIUS regu-
16For instance, Novartis, producing flu vaccine, lobbied on bills designed to ensure that the government has
a sufficient stockpile of influenza vaccine in case of an outbreak, and that the government helps pay for
vaccines for seniors and children. Novo Nordisk Inc. lobbied on legislation opposing proposals for the
government to negotiate prices paid for drugs for seniors under the Medicare program. Sanofi-Aventis
US Inc., producer of multiple cancer drugs, insulin pens and injections, lobbied on issues related to cancer
and diabetes awareness.
79
lated FDI in the defense industry, another issue areawhereUS subsidiaries of foreign firms
spenddisproportionatelymore compared toAmericanfirms. Copyright/patent/trademark
is another popular issue code lobbied by domestic subsidiaries, reflecting the difficulties
faced by foreign firms in creating regulatory coherency and establishing their intellectual
property rights in the US (Burgunder, 2010). Meanwhile, US subsidiaries of foreign firms
focus less on issue areas with relatively little policy impact on the foreign parents such as
in budget/appropriations and clean air & water.
3.5 Role of Foreign-connected PACs
Earlier findings that both the likelihood and level of corporate lobbying have a positive
and significant association with PAC activities suggest that the two means of political in-
fluence are complementary rather than substitutes (Hojnacki and Kimball, 2001; Tripathi,
Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2002; Lake, 2015; Kalla and Broockman, 2016). In my earlier
research (Chapter 2), I argue and show that foreign firms establish and utilize domestic
subsidiaries as ameans to gain access toUS politicians, an act I call ‘political foreign invest-
ment.’ Only domestically incorporated foreign firms can participate in federal elections.
Therefore, foreign firms that want to sponsor Political Action Committees need to do so
through their domestic subsidiaries. Generally, establishing and sponsoring a corporate
PAC is considered more visible than other forms of influencing the government such as
lobbying through registrants, giving to charity, or making donations through other (non
corporate) PACs. Thus the question becomes: are US subsidiaries of foreign firms that
sponsor foreign-connected PACs more politically motivated than those without PACs?
In fact, I find strong evidence thatUS subsidiaries of foreignfirmswith foreign-connected
PACs are among the most politically motivated and active firms. For instance, by com-
paring the means using t-tests, I find that US subsidiaries of foreign firms that sponsor
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foreign-connected PACs spend about 6 times more (p<0.001) in total lobbying on average
than those without connected PACs. While only a little more than one third in number,
the subsidiaries with connected PACs contributed to 76% of all lobbying spending by US
subsidiaries of foreign firms. Also, those with connected PACs spent about 5 times more
(p<0.001) on trade/tariff issues. Collectively, these results provide additional support for
the idea that foreign direct investment in the US partly serves as a means to gain political
access and influence. US subsidiaries with PAC establishments tend to be the most active
in their lobbying efforts, suggesting that the foreign-connected PACs’ political donations
are probably made with an intention to impact US policy in ways that serve the interests
of the foreign multinationals that control them.
3.6 Conclusion
This study demonstrates that a significant amount of foreign-connected lobbying has been
ongoing under the Lobbying Disclosure Act. In fact, the dollar amount of lobbying spend-
ing by these foreign-connected clients under the LDA is comparable to 70% of the entire
FARA spending.17 And yet, foreign lobbying influence has been only partially understood
through the FARA channel. Moreover, I find thatmost of the foreign-connected clients un-
der the LDA are in fact domestic subsidiaries of foreign firms. This finding suggests that
the political role of domestically incorporated foreign firms is substantial, and yet has been
largely overlooked.
I findmultiple points of evidence to support the theory that foreignfirms lobby through
17According to the Foreign LobbyWatch of the Center for Responsive Politics, $1,884,634,663 has been spent
by all foreign governments, foreign political parties, non-US citizens not residing in the US, and organiza-
tions with principal place of business in a foreign country, under FARA, from January 1, 2017 to present
(as of April 7, 2020). On average, the entire FARA spending over the 3.25 years was $580 million per year.
Meanwhile, under the LDA, about $722 million by majority foreign-owned US subsidiaries and another
$92 million by foreign-based firms were reported in 2015-2016 (resulting in an average of $407 million
spending per year). A crude comparison of the averages (in different periods) gives 407/580=0.7.
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these domestic subsidiaries. If US subsidiaries lobby to advocate both their interests and
those of their foreign parents, their observed lobbying behavior would be disproportion-
ate to their presence in the US. Supporting this idea, I find foreign ownership of domestic
firms to be associated with a greater chance of lobbying and a larger amount of spending
on lobbying. In terms of issue areas, I find domestic subsidiaries to lobby on a greater
variety of issues than comparable American firms. In the aggregate, and at the individ-
ual firm level, US subsidiaries lobbymore intensively than American firms on trade/tariff
issues, which is unambiguously an important issue area for foreignmultinationals. Lobby-
ing efforts by domestic subsidiaries are also concentrated in industry-specific issue codes
where much foreign direct investment occurs and which are likely to face challenges from
changes in US government regulation and policy.
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3.7 Appendix: Additional Models
Table A3.1: Extensive margin of lobbying with PAC indicator variable
binary outcome of lobbying
(1) (2)
foreign ownership 5.23∗∗∗ 5.26∗∗∗
(0.31) (0.31)
log revenue 0.98∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
foreign ownership·log revenue −0.48∗∗∗ −0.49∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04)
sponsored a PAC 0.83∗∗∗
(0.06)
Industry strata Yes Yes
State strata Yes Yes
Observations 203,759 203,759
Max. Possible R2 0.23 0.23
Note: unweighted. ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Table A3.2: Two-step hurdle model for lobbying
lobbying expenses I(lobbying expenses >0)
hurdle (second-step) logistic (first-step)
(1) (2)
foreign ownership 2.91∗∗∗ 8.27∗∗∗
(0.33) (0.35)
log revenue 0.51∗∗∗ 2.28∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
foreign ownership·log revenue −0.28∗∗∗ −0.80∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04)
Industry FE Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes
Observations 203,759 203,759
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Table A3.3: Lobbying interests in TRD/TAR (trade/tariffs) issues
log spending log count of reports
(1) (2) (3) (4)
foreign ownership 2.25∗∗ 1.68∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗
(0.74) (0.71) (0.14) (0.14)
log revenue 0.56∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01)
foreign ownership·log revenue −0.23∗∗ −0.17∗ −0.05∗∗ −0.04∗
(0.09) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02)
log PAC contributions 0.28∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.01)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,577 1,577 1,577 1,577
Adjusted R2 0.15 0.22 0.16 0.22
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Table A3.4: Lobbying interests in FOR (foreign relations) issues
log spending log count of reports
(1) (2) (3) (4)
foreign ownership 0.90∗ 0.77 0.15∗ 0.13
(0.41) (0.41) (0.07) (0.07)
log revenue 0.14∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.10)
foreign ownership·log revenue −0.11∗ −0.09 −0.02∗ −0.02∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01)
log PAC contributions 0.06∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.00)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,577 1,577 1,577 1,577
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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3.8 Appendix: Lobbying Issue Codes
Table A3.5: Description of lobbying issue codes
Code Description Code Description
ACC Accounting HOM Homeland Security
ADV Advertising HOU Housing
AER Aerospace IMM Immigration
AGR Agriculture IND Indian/Native American Affairs
ALC Alcohol & Drug Abuse INS Insurance
ANI Animals LBR Labor Issues/Antitrust/Workplace
APP Apparel/Clothing Industry/Textiles INT Intelligence and Surveillance
ART Arts/Entertainment LAW Law Enforcement/Crime/Criminal Justice
AUT Automotive Industry MAN Manufacturing
AVI Aviation/Aircraft/Airlines MAR Marine/Maritime/Boating/Fisheries
BAN Banking MED Medical/Disease Research/Clinical Labs
BNK Bankruptcy MIA Media (Information/Publishing)
BEV Beverage Industry MMM Medicare/Medicaid
BUD Budget/Appropriations MON Minting/Money/Gold Standard
CAW Clean Air & Water (Quality) NAT Natural Resources
CDT Commodities (Big Ticket) PHA Pharmacy
CHM Chemicals/Chemical Industry POS Postal
CIV Civil Rights/Civil Liberties RRR Railroads
COM Communications/Broadcasting/Radio/TV RES Real Estate/Land Use/Conservation
CPI Computer Industry REL Religion
CSP Consumer Issues/Safety/Protection RET Retirement
CON Constitution ROD Roads/Highway
CPT Copyright/Patent/Trademark SCI Science/Technology
DEF Defense SMB Small Business
DOC District of Columbia SPO Sports/Athletics
DIS Disaster Planning/Emergencies TAR Miscellaneous Tariff Bills
ECN Economics/Economic Development TAX Taxation/Internal Revenue Code
EDU Education TEC Telecommunications
ENG Energy/Nuclear TOB Tobacco
ENV Environmental/Superfund TOR Torts
FAM Family Issues/Abortion/Adoption TRD Trade (Domestic & Foreign)
FIR Firearms/Guns/Ammunition TRA Transportation
FIN Financial Institutions/Investments/Securities TOU Travel/Tourism
FOO Food Industry (Safety, Labeling, etc.) TRU Trucking/Shipping
FOR Foreign Relations URB Urban Development/Municipalities
FUE Fuel/Gas/Oil UNM Unemployment
GAM Gaming/Gambling/Casino UTI Utilities
GOV Government Issues VET Veterans
HCR Health Issues WAS Waste (hazardous/solid/interstate/nuclear)
WEL Welfare
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Banking
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Immigration
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Agriculture
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Air & Water
Science
Government
Law Enf.
Food
Natural Resources
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Pharmacy
Aerospace
Postal
Veterans
n.a.
Gaming
Chemicals
Manufacturing
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Railroads
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Bankruptcy
Tobacco
Medical
Utilities
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Automotive
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Tourism
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Roads
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Sports
Firearms
Native
Arts
Constitution
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Urban Devt.
Apparel
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Figure A3.1: Word cloud of American MNCs
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Figure A3.2: Word cloud of foreign MNCs in the US
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Chapter 4
Political FDI Through Cross-border M&A
Abstract
Can foreign firms gain political influence in the US through foreign direct investment? I
investigate this question by examining changes in domestic firms’ political activities after
cross-border M&A. I assemble panel data (1997-2018) of all US-based firms that spon-
sored PACs or disclosed their lobbying activities, and also experienced M&A deals that
resulted in majority ownership change during the period of political engagement. I find
that domestic firms tend to increase the dollar amount of campaign contributions and lob-
bying spending when they become foreign-owned. In contrast, no significant changes are
observed when a domestic firm is consolidated into another domestic firm. I also find
that domestic firms change their lobbying focus to issue areas of interest to foreign multi-
nationals following cross-border M&A. Collectively, these findings suggest that acquired
subsidiaries serve a political role in accessing and influencing policymakers in the US, and
thus FDI can be political.
4.1 Introduction
In prior studies (Chapters 2 and 3), I find strong cross-sectional evidence for a positive
association between foreign ownership of a US firm and its corporate political activities.
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Among a representative sample of domestic firms, majority foreign-owned firms (com-
pared to American-owned firms) are associated with a greater likelihood of sponsoring
a corporate Political Action Committee (PAC) and a greater likelihood of lobbying. Then
among firms that choose to engage in these political activities, foreign ownership is associ-
ated with a greater dollar amount of campaign contributions and a greater dollar amount
of lobbying spending. These patterns continue to hold after controlling for firm charac-
teristics such as size, industry, location, and the extent of global integration.
Together, these findings (along with other evidence documented in Chapters 2 and 3)
support a theory that foreign firms gain a foothold in US politics through their domesti-
cally incorporated subsidiaries. Foreign firms that trade with and invest in the US have
strong incentives to influence US public policy in ways that help them safeguard existing
sales and investment or create future opportunities for growth. However, US laws restrict
foreign political activities while allowing US subsidiaries of foreign firms to engage in fed-
eral elections and lobbying just like American-owned firms. This legal environment (com-
pounded with the attractiveness of the US market) encourages foreign firms to gain local
presence in the US by investing. US subsidiaries formed through this ‘political foreign
investment’ consequently give campaign contributions to federal candidates and lobby
policymakers on behalf of their much larger, multinational foreign parent firms.
In this paper, I build a stronger causal case for the aforementioned theory and positive
association between foreign ownership and corporate political activities in the US. I do
this by exploiting changes in majority ownership of firms over time. In fact, the dominant
entry mode of foreign direct investment in the US is cross-border mergers & acquisition
(M&A). If political foreign investment occurs through cross-border M&A, the target do-
mestic firm becomes a US subsidiary of a foreign multinational corporation (MNC), and
it is then expected to serve the political interests of the foreign MNC. If so, I expect pat-
terns of political activities by the newly acquired subsidiary to change significantly from
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pre-M&A. In particular, I expect the firms to give more campaign contributions, to spend
more on lobbying, and to change their lobbying focus to issue areas important to their new
foreign parents.
I therefore conduct panel analyses of firmpolitical activities across different ownership
states – ‘pre-M&A,’ ’post-foreign M&A’ (when a domestic firm becomes majority foreign-
owned), and ‘post-domestic M&A’ (when a domestic firm is consolidated into another
domestic firm by more than a majority share). By including firm fixed effects, I examine
changes in political activitieswithin the same firmbased on its ownership state. By includ-
ing ‘post-domestic M&A’ cases, I am able to compare between subsidiaries with foreign
vs. domestic Global Ultimate Owners. Comparing among these subsidiaries that have the
potential of representing interests of their parents, I am able to attribute potential differ-
ences between ‘post-foreign M&A’ and ‘post-domestic M&A’ to characteristics unique to
foreign-ownership. For instance, US subsidiaries of domestic firms may not have to rep-
resent interests of their domestic parents, because both domestic parents and subsidiaries
already have equal standing under the US federal election and lobbying laws. Meanwhile,
any temporal changes or M&A-specific features that might affect corporate political activ-
ities post-M&A should affect domestic-owned and foreign-owned firms equally.
In order to test these ideas, I first assembled original panel data, from 1997 to 2018,
that identify all US-based firms that engaged in either PAC or lobbying activities. Among
these firms, I further identified firms that have also experienced a majority ownership
change during the period they were politically active. The data were collected from mul-
tiple sources – Zephyr M&A, Federal Election Committee, Center for Responsive Politics,
LobbyView (Kim, 2018), and Orbis – and merged based on unique firm identifiers (Bu-
reau vanDijk identifiers), which I again collected and updated through different processes
which I explain later in the paper. Ultimately, I trace the PAC activities of 244 firms that
went through M&A resulting in majority ownership change while their corporate PACs
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were registered with the FEC, and the lobbying activities of 566 firms that experienced
ownership change within the years they have filed lobbying reports under the Lobbying
Disclosure Act.
From these data I find that foreignM&A is indeed associatedwith a greater intensity of
political activities. Corporate PACs tend to increase their dollar amount of campaign con-
tributions once their corporate sponsors become majority foreign-owned. Similarly, firms
tend to increase their lobbying spending post-foreign M&A. Importantly, these changes
are significant only for foreign M&A cases, and not for domestic M&A cases. In terms of
lobbying contents, when domestic firms become foreign-owned, they start focusing more
on issue codes such as trade, copyright/patent/trademark, taxation, and banking, which
are critical to foreign MNCs. Meanwhile, post-foreign M&A, there is a drastic increase
in aggregate percentage lobbying spending on telecommunications, an industry in which
FDI into the US is highly regulated. These results strongly suggest that domestic sub-
sidiaries can be of much political value to foreign investors, adding support to the idea of
political foreign investment in the US.
This study builds on latest research on the political role of multinational corporations
in the global economy (Kim and Milner, 2019; Johns, Pelc and Wellhausen, 2019). I high-
light the political role that domestic subsidiaries of MNCs can play in accessing and influ-
encing policymakers in their host countries, and I suggest that FDI itself may be politically
motivated (Chapters 2 and 3). I also create and examine unique panel datasets of corpo-
rate engagement in federal elections and lobbying in the US, contributing to the broader
literature on corporate political activities (Hillman, Keim and Schuler, 2004; Lux, Crook
and Woehr, 2011). Notably, through these data I again confirm a positive association be-
tween foreign ownership of a US firm and its corporate political activities (Chapters 2 and
3), in contrast to empirical findings from earlier studies on foreign multinationals in the
US (Mitchell, Hansen and Jepsen, 1997; Hansen and Mitchell, 2000).
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4.2 Theory of Cross-border M&A and Political Activities
Globally integrated firms are a powerful interest group. For these firms, the US is an im-
portant marketplace for growing businesses and political leverage. However, US laws im-
pose limitations on foreign political engagement. Thismotivates foreignfirms to have local
presence in the US through foreign direct investment. US subsidiaries acquired through
cross-border M&A can serve as domestic political agents of their foreign owners. Politi-
cally motivated cross-border M&A deals are expected to change patterns of political ac-
tivities of the acquired domestic firms.
Globally integrated firms and their political strategies
Through trade and foreign direct investment, firms can expand their businesses interna-
tionally (Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple, 2004; Pandya, 2016). In today’s integrated global
economy, firms that successfully engage with international markets grow rapidly in size
and profitability. The McKinsey Global Institute finds that the world’s largest firms (top
1% of firms with annual revenue greater than $1 billion) generate more than 42% of total
sales from outside their home country (Manyika et al., 2018). Meanwhile, multinational
corporations, those that own or control value-adding activities in more than one country,
account for half of global exports, almost one-third of world GDP, and about one-fourth
of global employment (OECD, 2018).
Despite the prospects for concentrated economic gains, doing business internationally
also means those firms to become subject to new political and regulatory environments.
For instance, government policies on taxation, trade, foreign investment, exchange rates,
intellectual property, etc. elsewhere have large implications for the profitability of firms
that have commercial interests in another counties.1 This exposure to government policies
1 See Chapter 2 for a further discussion on how firms trading with or investing in other countries are im-
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outside of their own country creates strong incentives for globally integrated firms to in-
fluence public policies in external markets of their interest. Consequently, firms are likely
to devise political strategies to safeguard existing foreign sales and investment and/or to
create future opportunities for growth.
Not surprisingly, large, multinational firms aremore active in political activities (Drope
and Hansen, 2006; Huneeus and Kim, 2018; Kim and Milner, 2019). In particular, MNCs
have been the main proponents of preferential trade agreements and bilateral investment
treaties, in which they have tried to liberalize services and include provisions of invest-
ment protection and intellectual property rights (Manger, 2009; Dür, Baccini and Elsig,
2014; Blanchard andMatschke, 2015; Kim, 2015; Rodrik, 2018; Baccini, 2019;Osgood, 2019).
Lately, with the growing political discontent towards globalization, these firms have mo-
bilized to defend global economic integration through lobbying and campaign contribu-
tions, public hearings, and public notice and comment (Lee and Osgood, 2019, forthcom-
ing). However, most studies document the political engagement of global firms in their
own countries. This paper focuses on political strategies that global firms employ in ex-
ternal markets.
Political foreign investment in the US through cross-border M&A
The United States is a unique economic and political marketplace for firms with a global
reach. The US has one of the largest consumer bases in the world, attracts the largest
amount of inward FDI, and frequently sets the global standards (technical and regulatory)
for goods and services. Meanwhile, US federal laws on corporate political engagement
provide an (unintended) advantage for foreign firms with local presence. For instance,
the Federal Election Campaign Act bans foreign participation in US elections. However,
the US subsidiaries of foreign firms can engage in federal campaigns, as they have a ‘prin-
pacted by public policy in those countries.
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cipal place of business’ within the US. In addition, foreign firms are allowed to lobby the
US government as long as they disclose their activities under either the Foreign Agents
Registration Act or the domestic Lobbying Disclosure Act. However, as US subsidiaries of
foreign firms undoubtedly fall under the purview of the LDA, the majority of foreign firm
lobbying is reported on behalf of these subsidiaries.2
The economic significance of theUSmarket combinedwith legal advantages of gaining
local presence encourages foreign firms to invest in the US as part of their political calcu-
lation. I call this act ‘political foreign investment.’ Foreign firmswith political agendas are
thus expected to rely upon their US subsidiaries to formulate and implement political ac-
tivities. Effectively, the domestic subsidiaries of these foreign firms act as political agents
of their parent firms in the US.
Foreign direct investment can either take the form of building a new establishment (i.e.,
greenfield investment) or acquiring a domestic firm (i.e., cross-border mergers & acquisi-
tions). FDI in the US primarily takes the form of cross-borderM&A. In fact, the US Bureau
of Economic Analysis suggests that M&A accounted for an average of 96% of FDI expen-
ditures from 2014 to 2018, using a definition of inward FDI as “when a foreign investor
owns at least 10 percent of a U.S. business” (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2019).
Economic reasons for this preference may be multifaceted (Nocke and Yeaple, 2007;
Qiu and Wang, 2011). However, one notable advantage of cross-border M&A to the for-
eign buyer is how the parent can increase its knowledge base. The foreign MNC buys an
“operating local management familiar with the national market environment,” and as a
result, “a stock of valuable information” from the acquired firm is transferred to the new
owner (Caves, 1996; Nocke and Yeaple, 2007). Conventionally, these statements refer to
the economic environment of the host country market and related information. However,
2 See Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion on how foreign firms lobby through domestic subsidiaries in the
US.
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for foreign investors acquiring domestic firms, political expertise and experience can also
be a valuable asset that they are purchasing or inheriting. In contrast, foreign investment
through greenfield investment cannot deliver these benefits.
Empirical implications for ownership change and corporate political activities
When a cross-border M&A occurs, the acquired domestic firm becomes foreign-affiliated
to the extent that the foreign acquirer holds ownership or control of the firm. In this paper
I focus onM&A deals that result in majority (50.01% or more) ownership change.3 Specif-
ically, I consider M&A deals that result in majority foreign-ownership as ‘foreign M&A’
deals. In contrast, when a domestic firm is consolidated into another domestic firm by
more than a majority share, I call it ‘domestic M&A.’
When a foreign M&A occurs, the target domestic firm becomes a US subsidiary of the
Global Ultimate Owner which is now a foreignmultinational corporation (if it was not be-
fore). As discussed above, MNCs have abundant economic resources that can be invested
in ways to influence public policies favorable to them. If this newly acquired subsidiary
were to serve the political interests of the foreign MNC, I expect the firm’s political en-
gagement to change significantly post-foreign M&A. However, I expect this change to dif-
fer from how a domestic firmmight change its political engagement after merging with or
being acquired by another domestic firm (post-domestic M&A). Effectively, the expected
different pathways of domestic firms post-foreign acquisition and post-domestic acquisi-
tion are attributable towhether they engage in political activities on behalf of their (foreign
vs. domestic) parent firms or not. I expect changes in firm engagement in campaign fi-
nance and lobbying post-foreign M&A as below.
Foreign M&A increases PAC giving Recall that foreign firms cannot sponsor Political Ac-
tion Committees and engage in federal elections. However, US-incorporated subsidiaries
3 I do not include M&A deals that result in less than 50% ownership.
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of foreign firms can create/control PACs and give campaign contributions to federal can-
didates, same as any other domestic firm. If foreign firms use domestic subsidiaries as a
way to gain access to federal candidates, it is expected that the newly foreign-controlled
domestic firms will actively engage in PAC activities. Furthermore, these domestic sub-
sidiaries will now represent policy interests of their parent foreign multinationals in the
US as local political agents. In Chapter 2 I show that US subsidiaries of foreign MNCs
tend to give more than American-owned firms. In fact, the amount of contributions made
by US subsidiaries had a stronger association with the size of foreign MNCs than the sub-
sidiaries, suggesting that they engage in federal elections on behalf of the parents. Simi-
larly, as domestic firms become foreign-owned, and represent the policy interests of their
much larger foreign MNCs, the observed dollar amount of campaign contributions from
their sponsored PACs to federal candidates is expected to increase post-foreign M&A.
Foreign M&A increases lobbying Meanwhile, if foreign MNCs lobby through their do-
mestic subsidiaries, the newly acquired firms are expected to lobby on behalf of both
their US operations and their foreign parents. In Chapter 3 I show that US subsidiaries
of foreign MNCs tend to spend more on lobbying than American-owned firms, as the
subsidiaries represent policy interests of both the domestic operations and foreign head-
quarters. Similarly, I expect here that domestic firms will increase the amount of lobbying
spending post-foreignM&A in order tomeet the greater policy demands of foreignMNCs.
Foreign M&A changes lobbying content In terms of the lobbying content, domestic firms
post-foreign M&A are expected to feature distinct patterns of lobbying that are character-
istic of foreign MNCs. Most MNCs export and/or import and are deeply integrated into
global value chains (Bernard et al., 2007; Yeaple, 2009). Therefore, domestic subsidiaries
representing foreign MNCs are likely to lobby intensively on trade issues. Also, MNCs
account for at least 50% of R&D spending worldwide and create and own intellectual
property (IP) in a variety of important technologies (Keller, 2010; Zeile, 2014). As each
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country has its own laws governing IP, and governments are concerned about guarantee-
ing access to those technologies at a reasonable cost, the subsidiaries of foreign firms are
expected to concentrate their lobbying efforts on copyright/patent/trademark issues on
behalf of IP developed within the entire corporate group.4 MNC’s worldwide tax plan-
ning and high level of global integration necessitate cross-country and intra-firm transfers
(Desai, Foley andHines Jr., 2006, 2007). The foreignMNCs’ attention to securing favorable
tax regulations and free movement of capital is expected to increase lobbying on taxation
and banking issues by their domestic subsidiaries. In addition, I expect to find increased
lobbying in industry-specific issue codeswheremost foreign direct investment in the US is
concentrated (e.g., pharmacy, transportation), and where inward FDI is highly regulated
by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the US (e.g., telecommunications, defense).
4.3 The Data
I assembled original panel data that identifies all US-based firms that either engaged in
federal elections or federal lobbying from 1997 to 2018 and also went through at least
one majority ownership change during the period. This dataset is a product of multi-
ple data sources which I have updated and modified for purposes of this paper. The first
data source is Zephyr, from which I exported all completed (confirmed and assumed)
acquisition and merger type deals targeting firms with primary addresses in the United
States. I focused onM&A deals that resulted in a change in majority ownership from 1998
to present.5 Based on country code information regarding the Global Ultimate Owners
4 According a BEA study, majority foreign-owned US subsidiaries account for about 15% of US industrial
R&D, triple their share of production or employment by all US businesses (Zeile, 2013).
5 The data were collected on February 16th, 2020. There were 114,500 deals in total that fit the initial con-
ditions. Cases were further reduced through the process of verifying assumed cases – only the confirmed
cases were considered. I also dropped M&A deals that result in rebranding or restructuring such as
records of name change, privatization, or going public, etc.
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(GUOs) of the target and acquiror companies, I distinguished foreign M&A cases from
domestic M&A cases. For instance, US-based firms that merge with or are acquired by
other US-based firms that are in fact majority owned by foreign firms were considered as
foreign M&A rather than domestic M&A. Note that many firms experienced more than
one M&A deal during the period. Based on the year of acquisition and the nationality
of the GUO of the acquiror, I created an indicator variable distinguishing the ownership
status of firms: ‘pre-M&A,’ ‘post-domestic M&A,’ and ‘post-foreign M&A.’
To collect information on corporate engagement in federal elections, I first downloaded
committee master files that contain information of committees registered with the Federal
Election Committees in each election cycle (1979-1980 to 2019-2020) from the FEC web-
site. From the bulk data I assembled a dataset with unique committee identifiers, com-
mittee names, the names of their connected organizations and street addresses of these
connected organizations, and the first and last election cycles that they were registered
with the FEC for all (5,784) ‘corporate’ type Political Action Committees. Then, using
the street addresses and names of the identified connected organizations, I individually
matched each corporate PAC with the unique firm identifier (Bureau van Dijk identifier,
BvD ID) of its sponsoring firm. These identifiers were used to merge the PAC information
with the M&A data (matched with the BvD ID of the target firms). In total, there were 384
corporate sponsors with corporate PACs that ever registered with the FEC, that also went
through at least one majority ownership change in between the 1998 and 2018 election cy-
cles. However, these firms include those that sponsored a PAC only before or after a M&A
deal. Therefore, I focused on 244 firms that experienced an ownership change when their
corporate PACs were registered with the FEC. For these sponsoring firms, I web-scraped
the total dollar amount of contributions made by each sponsored corporate PAC to federal
candidates from the 1998 to 2018 election cycles from the Center for Responsive Politics.
This became the basis of the PAC contributions panel data used in this paper.
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Table 4.1: Number of firms in dataset
Step result Total result
Firm Ownership Change
1. Deal type: Acquisition, Merger 735,667 735,667
2. Current deal Status: Completed (confirmed and assumed) 1,714,067 584,077
3. Country (primary address) of target: USA 402,726 114,500
1 and 2 and 3 (as of 02/16/2020) 114,500
Firm Engagement in Political Activities
4. Target (acquired) firms’ corporate PAC is active (1998-2018 election cycle)
5. Target (acquired) firm files lobbying reports (1999-2017)
1 and 2 and 3 and 4 (years may not overlap) 384
1 and 2 and 3 happen during 4 244
1 and 2 and 3 and 5 (years may not overlap) 1,124
1 and 2 and 3 happen during 5 566
I also collected information on corporate engagement in federal lobbying. As the ba-
sis, I downloaded all lobbying reports filed on behalf of corporate clients from 1999 to
2017 using the LobbyView (Kim, 2018) application programming interface. I queried the
data in a way that disaggregates information in each lobbying report by the client name
and matched BvD ID, report type, registrant name, year, reported lobbying income or ex-
penses, and issue codes reflecting the general issue areas in which the registrant engaged
in lobbying on behalf of the client.6 I divided the total lobbying spending in each report by
the number of general issue codes indicated as a proxy for how much was spent on each
issue area. I further updated the BvD IDs for the corporate clients, and using the new BvD
IDs, I merged the M&A data with the lobbying data (again matched with the BvD ID of
the target firms). In total, I found 1124 unique firms that lobbied the federal government
at some point during the years and also experienced at least oneM&A deal. Among these
6 Note that in each lobbying report, registrants disclose the dollar amount of income or expenses relating to
lobbying activities for the relevant reporting period only if the amount is greater than a certain threshold.
This threshold was $10,000 prior to 2008 and $5,000 from 2008 on. For lobbying spending below these
values, registrants simply mark a box indicating that the income/expense is less than those values. For
the empirical analyses in the main text, I imputed the middle value of $5,000 and $2,500 for missing values
when a lobbying report was filed but without lobbying amounts (unless they are a report type that does
not require amount reporting such as Registration or Registration Amendment). In Appendix Tables A4.4
and A4.5, I replicate the main analyses (Table 4.3) by imputing the maximum threshold values of $10,000
or $5,000 and the minimum value of zero.
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firms, I focus on the 566 firms that have experienced ownership change within the years
that the firm filed lobbying reports. For these firms, I aggregated the lobbying spending
by each year.
4.4 Empirical Tests and Results
In order to test whether foreign ownership of a US firm influences its political behavior,
I conduct panel studies of corporate engagement in US federal elections and federal lob-
bying. Specifically, I test whether there are meaningful changes in the dollar amount of
campaign contributions or lobbying spending among firms that went through a majority
ownership change as a result of M&A. While the focus of my study is on foreign M&A
cases, I include domestic M&A cases in my analyses so that I have a comparison group
that shares temporal or any M&A-specific characteristics that might be attributable to dif-
ferences in the political behavior pre- and post- new ownership.
4.4.1 Change in Campaign Finance
First I test whether domestic firms’ engagement in campaign finance changes post-M&A,
and if so, how. I analyze how much corporate PACs give to federal candidates from 1997-
1998 to 2017-2018, along the three possible ownership states of pre-M&A, post-domestic
M&A, and post-foreign M&A. The PAC-cycle pairs included in the ‘all PACs’ analyses are
all (244) corporate PACs that are sponsored by firms that have gone through a majority
ownership change during the period the PACwas registered with the FEC. In many cases,
corporate PACs are terminated once its sponsoring firm is merged with or acquired by
another firm. I thus identify the subgroup of (139) corporate PACs that continue to remain
active andmake contributions post-acquisition for at least one cycle and call this subgroup
‘continuing PACs.’
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Table 4.2: Total campaign contributions (1998-2018 election cycles)
total campaign contributions (PAC-cycle)
all PACs continuing PACs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
post-domestic M&A 14, 580 −11, 818 28, 307∗ −5, 901
(8, 524) (6, 706) (11, 023) (9, 168)
post-foreign M&A 18, 836 24, 537∗∗ 21, 761 30, 737∗∗
(10, 285) (9, 294) (12, 027) (10, 760)
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,575 1,575 1,065 1,065
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.575 0.005 0.559
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
In Table 4.2 I regress the dollar amount of campaign contributions delivered to federal
candidates by corporate PACs in each election cycle by the three possible ownership states
of their sponsoring firms using an ordinary least square regression model. Models (1)
and (3) capture the general correlation between the level of campaign contributions and
the three ownership states (pre-M&A is used as the reference group); and models (2) and
(4), which include firm fixed effects, demonstrates any amount changes within the PACs.
In models (1) and (3) without firm fixed effects, the dollar amount of campaign con-
tributions and the two post-M&A states of the sponsoring firms (vs. pre-M&A) appear to
have a positive association. But only the domestic M&A state among continuing PACs is
statistically significant. Within each PAC (models (2) and (4) with fixed effects), however,
it is clear that a greater amount of campaign contribution is associatedwith the post-M&A
state, only when the PAC’s sponsoring firm is newly owned by a foreign firm. In fact, the
same corporate PAC is associated with $24,500-$30,700 more political giving in an election
cycle when foreign-owned than when American-owned.7
Two additional points are worth noting. First, the amount of campaign contributions
7 For the main analysis, I code a PAC to be in a post-M&A state starting with the election cycle that the
year of M&A falls under. I find similar patterns if I code the post-M&A state starting with the consecutive
election cycle. See Appendix Table A4.1 for the replication results.
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post-foreign M&A and post-domestic M&A is significantly different within a firm. In
fact, Appendix Table A4.2 shows that post-foreign M&A amounts tend to be significantly
greater than post-domestic M&A amounts. One might suspect that the reason why cam-
paign contributions tend to increase post-M&A only for foreign M&A cases is because
the acquired domestic firms automatically become part of a MNC. In order to rule out this
possibility, I run a separate sub-sample analysis only among cases inwhich domestic firms
become part of a MNC – either through foreign M&A or a domestic M&A deal in which
the acquiror is a domestic MNC.8 As shown in Appendix Table A4.3, only M&A deals
with foreignMNCs are associated with a greater amount of campaign contributions. This
finding gives further support to the idea that foreign M&A is associated with more polit-
ical giving because the newly acquired firm is representing policy interests of the parent,
rather than becoming part of a MNC.
4.4.2 Change in Lobbying Spending
Does a merger or acquisition also impact firms’ lobbying activities? In the following I ex-
amine whether corporate lobbying spending is impacted by majority ownership change,
and how it is impacted. I examine the patterns of firms’ overall lobbying spending – lobby-
ing income that outside registrants make from their corporate clients or lobbying expenses
accrued to the clients from paying in-house lobbyists – and their relative spending on gen-
eral issue areas.
I start with observing how much firms spend on lobbying from 1999 to 2017, again
along the three ownership states of pre-M&A, post-domesticM&A, andpost-foreignM&A.
The firm-year pairs included in the ‘all firms’ analyses are all (566) firms that have gone
through a majority ownership change during the period they engaged in lobbying activi-
8 In order to identify domesticMNCs, I look atwhether the acquiring firmhas at least one subsidiary outside
of the US.
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Table 4.3: Total lobbying spending (1999-2017)
total lobbying spending (firm-year) in logs
all firms continuing firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
post-domestic M&A −0.48∗∗∗ −0.08 −0.34∗ 0.18
(0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.14)
post-foreign M&A −0.13 0.35∗ −0.08 0.40∗
(0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18)
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 5,808 5,808 4,112 4,112
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.444 0.001 0.462
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
ties. As before, many firms discontinue their lobbying activities once an ownership change
occurs. I separately treat the (396) firms that continue to lobby post-M&A for at least one
year as ‘continuing firms.’
Table 4.3 presents the relationship between (natural log transformed) annual lobbying
spending and the indicator variables representing change in ownership using an ordinary
least square regression model. Similar to above, models (1) and (3) summarize the gen-
eral correlation between the level of lobbying spending and the three ownership states
(pre-M&A is used as the reference group); models (2) and (4) include firm fixed effects to
capture changes in lobbying within firms.
The results suggest that ownership change of a firm can alter its lobbying spending
behavior, in a way that depends on the nationality of the new owner. Without includ-
ing firm fixed effects, the post-domestic M&A state is associated with significantly less
lobbying spending than the pre-M&A state; in contrast, the post-foreign M&A state does
not show significant differences from the reference group. However, once firm fixed ef-
fects are included in models (2) and (4), a new pattern emerges – within the same firm,
foreign-M&A is associatedwith significantly higher lobbying spending, whereas there are
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Table 4.4: Issue-specific lobbying spending (1999-2017)
lobbying spending per issue code (firm-year) in logs
all firms continuing firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
post-domestic M&A −0.08 −0.04 0.02 0.13
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
post-foreign M&A 0.16∗ 0.25∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 4,973 4,973 3,503 3,503
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.431 0.002 0.436
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
no significant changes in the case of a domestic M&A. Overall, foreign-acquisition of an
domestic firm is associated with a 42-50% increase (corresponding to the 0.35 and 0.49 log
changes in the Table) in annual lobbying spending.
Now is this increased total lobbying spending simply a numeric outcome due to a (po-
tentially) greater variety of lobbying issue areas post-M&A? To answer this question, I
re-examine the relationship between ownership change of a firm and lobbying spending
in Table 4.4, using an alternativemeasure of lobbying intensity – (natural log transformed)
lobbying spending per unique issue code. Here I divide the total dollar amount of annual
lobbying spending by the number of unique issue codes that firms lobbied on that year.
Note that the number of observations has decreased due to original lobbying reports with
lobbying spending information but no indication of the general issue codes. As shown,
the positive association between foreign-M&A of a domestic firm and lobbying spend-
ing continues to hold using this alternative measure of lobbying intensity. Overall, firms
spend 28-38% more annually per issue area once they become majority foreign-owned.
Similar to the changes in campaign finance demonstrated above, I find a significant
difference in both total lobbying spending and issue-specific lobbying spending between
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the post-foreign M&A state and post-domestic M&A state within firms.9 Also, among a
sub-sample of domestic firms that experience M&A with multinational firms, I find the
same patterns in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4: the total lobbying spending and issue-specific
lobbying spending is significantly greater than pre-M&A only for foreign M&A deals.10
Importantly, this suggests that firms do not simply increase their lobbying intensity post-
foreign M&A because they are now multinational, but because US subsidiaries of foreign
firms uniquely play a role of representing their parents’ interests.
So far I have demonstrated changes in firms’ lobbying spending post-M&A. How does
the lobbying content compare between firms pre-M&A and post-M&A? In particular, how
do firms change their lobbying focus based on the nationality of their new parent firms?
To answer these questions, I refer to 21,868 entries of disaggregated lobbying data on how
much each firm spent on a unique general issue code in each year.11 Using the same own-
ership categories of pre-M&A, post-domestic M&A, and post-foreign-M&A, I aggregated
the total amount of lobbying spending by issue code for each of the three groups. Then,
for each issue code, I calculated the proportion of group spending in that particular is-
sue code relative to the total group lobbying spending, and repeated this process for all
three ownership categories. This process produces ameasure of relative spending on each
lobbying issue code which is comparable among the three groups.
For instance, Figure 4.1 presents the top 10 issue codes where firms spend more (as a
group) post-foreignM&A than pre-M&A. The dumbell figure for each issue code indicates
the percentage spending by all American firms pre-acquisition (depicted by a gray star),
the percentage spending by all American firms post-domestic acquisition (depicted by
a gray circle), and the percentage spending post-foreign acquisition (depicted by a red
9 See Appendix Table A4.6 and Table A4.7.
10See Appendix Table A4.8 and Table A4.9.
11These data are created by aggregating 92,408 itemized reports of clients’ name, year, name of registrant,
report type, and issue codes.
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Figure 4.1: Top 10 issue codes with higher percentage spending post-foreign M&A
circle). The longer the dumbells, the greater is the increase in percentage spending once
American firms are acquired by foreign firms.
As the political foreign investment theory predicts, the foreign M&A group focuses its
lobbying on issue areas thatMNCs are primarily concerned about. For instance, there is an
increase in percentage spending in issue codes such as trade, copyright/patent/trademark,
taxation, andbanking. Moreover, Figure 4.2 that compares issue-specific percentage spend-
ing only among firms that become part of a MNC show that the lobbying emphasis on
these issues are particularly pronounced in the case of M&A with foreign firms. Mean-
while, there is a substantial increase in percentage spending on telecommunications, a
highly regulated industry for inward FDI. Note that these are the exact issue codes where
foreign-owned firms tend to focus their lobbying efforts compared to domestic firms in a
cross-sectional analysis (as demonstrated in Chapter 3).12
12 In Appendix Figure A4.1 I present the top 10 issue codes with largest differences between foreign- and
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Figure 4.2: Replication of Figure 4.1 among M&A deals with MNCs only
4.5 Conclusion
Globally integrated firms are often among the most powerful interest groups worldwide.
However, little is known about how these firms manage to navigate through new political
and regulatory environments as they expand businesses across borders. I argue that gain-
ing political influence in external markets is crucial for these firms to protect foreign sales
and investment, if not create future opportunities for growth. However political activi-
ties are often limited to domestic agents only. How then do global firms influence public
policy outside of their home countries?
Here and elsewhere (Chapters 2 and 3) I propose a theory that foreign firms may en-
gage in political foreign investment, by which foreign firms gain local presence and influ-
American-acquired firms.
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ence public policy through the political activities of their domestic subsidiaries. In this
paper, I create and examine panel data on US-based firms’ engagement in federal elec-
tions and federal lobbying as they go through M&A deals that result in majority owner-
ship change. By comparing firms’ political activities pre- and post-M&A, and by analyz-
ing differences between firms that become majority foreign-owned (post-foreign M&A)
and those consolidated into different domestic firms (post-domestic M&A), I find several
pieces of evidence suggesting that inward FDI through M&A serves political purposes
beyond those economic.
Specifically, I find that domestic firms tend to give more to federal candidates once
they become majority foreign-owned. Similarly, the dollar amount of total and and issue-
specific lobbying spending tend to increase post-foreign M&A. In contrast, there is no
significant change in the amount of campaign contributions or lobbying spending among
domestic M&A cases. I also find notable changes in the issue focus of lobbying among
firms that go through foreign M&A. Aggregate percentage spending in issue areas that
are likely to affect foreign parent firms, including trade, copyright/patent/trademark, tax-
ation, banking, and telecommunications is higher than pre-M&A. Together, these results
provide strong evidence for the idea that the newly acquired subsidiaries are represent-
ing policy interests of their foreign owners. Therefore, it is plausible that foreign firms are
gaining footholds in US politics through political foreign investment.
112
Bibliography
Baccini, Leonardo. 2019. “The economics and politics of preferential trade agreements.”
Annual Review of Political Science 22:75–92.
Bernard, Andrew B., J. Bradford Jensen, Stephen J. Redding and Peter K. Schott. 2007.
“Firms in international trade.” Journal of Economic perspectives 21(3):105–130.
Blanchard, Emily and Xenia Matschke. 2015. “US multinationals and preferential market
access.” Review of Economics and Statistics 97(4):839–854.
Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of Commerce. 2019. “New foreign direct in-
vestment in the United States, 2018.” News Release available from https://www.bea.
gov/system/files/2019-07/fdi0719.pdf.
Caves, Richard E. 1996. Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Desai, Mihir A., C. Fritz Foley and James R. Hines Jr. 2006. “Taxation and multinational
activity: New evidence, new interpretations.” Survey of Current Business 86(2).
Desai, Mihir A., C. Fritz Foley and James R. Hines Jr. 2007. “The internal markets of multi-
national firms.” Survey of Current Business 87(3).
Drope, JeffreyM andWendy LHansen. 2006. “Does firm size matter? Analyzing business
lobbying in the United States.” Business and Politics 8(2):1–17.
Dür, Andreas, Leonardo Baccini and Manfred Elsig. 2014. “The design of international
trade agreements: Introducing a new dataset.” The Review of International Organizations
9(3):353–375.
Hansen, Wendy L. and Neil J. Mitchell. 2000. “Disaggregating and explaining corporate
political activity: Domestic and foreign corporations in national politics.” American Po-
litical Science Review 94(4):891–903.
Helpman, Elhanan, Marc J. Melitz and Stephen R. Yeaple. 2004. “Export versus FDI with
heterogeneous firms.” American Economic Review 94(1):300–316.
Hillman, Amy J., Gerald D. Keim andDouglas Schuler. 2004. “Corporate political activity:
A review and research agenda.” Journal of Management 30(6):837–857.
113
Huneeus, Federico and In Song Kim. 2018. “The effects of firms’ lobbying on resource
misallocation.”MIT Political Science Department Research Paper .
Johns, Leslie, Krzysztof J. Pelc and Rachel L.Wellhausen. 2019. “How a retreat from global
economic governancemay empower business interests.” The Journal of Politics 81(2):731–
738.
Keller, Wolfgang. 2010. International trade, foreign direct investment, and technology
spillovers. In Handbook of the Economics of Innovation. Vol. 2 Elsevier pp. 793–829.
Kim, In Song. 2018. “LobbyView: Firm-level lobbying & congressional bills database.”
Working Paper available from http://web.mit.edu/insong/www/pdf/lobbyview.pdf.
Kim, In Song and Helen V. Milner. 2019. “Multinational corporations and their influ-
ence through lobbying on foreign policy.”Multinational Corporations in a Changing Global
Economy .
Kim, Soo Yeon. 2015. “Deep integration and regional trade agreements.” The Oxford Hand-
book of the Political Economy of International Trade pp. 360–379.
Lee, Jieun and Iain Osgood. 2019. “Exports, jobs, growth! Congressional hearings on US
trade agreements.” Economics & Politics 31(1):1–26.
Lee, Jieun and Iain Osgood. forthcoming. Firms fight back: Production networks and
corporate opposition to theChina tradewar. InThe Role of Design and ProductionNetworks
in East Asian Security, ed. Etel Solingen. Cambridge University Press.
Lux, Sean, T. Russell Crook and David J. Woehr. 2011. “Mixing business with politics: A
meta-analysis of the antecedents and outcomes of corporate political activity.” Journal
of Management 37(1):223–247.
Manger, Mark S. 2009. Investing in Protection: The Politics of Preferential Trade Agreements
Between North and South. Cambridge University Press.
Manyika, James, Sree Ramaswamy, Jacques Bughin, Jonathan Woetzel, Michael Birshan
and Zubin Nagpal. 2018. “Superstars: The dynamics of firms, sectors, and cities leading
the global economy.”McKinsey Global Institute Discussion Paper .
Mitchell, Neil J, Wendy LHansen and EricM Jepsen. 1997. “The determinants of domestic
and foreign corporate political activity.” The Journal of Politics 59(4):1096–1113.
Nocke, Volker and Stephen Yeaple. 2007. “Cross-border mergers and acquisitions vs.
greenfield foreign direct investment: The role of firm heterogeneity.” Journal of Inter-
national Economics 72(2):336–365.
114
OECD. 2018. “Multinational enterprises in the global economy: Heavily debated but
hardly measured.”. Policy Note available from https://www.oecd.org/industry/ind/
MNEs-in-the-global-economy-policy-note.pdf.
Osgood, Iain. 2019. “Vanguards of globalization: Organization and political action among
America’s pro-trade firms.” Business and Politics pp. 1–35.
Pandya, Sonal S. 2016. “Political economy of foreign direct investment: Globalized pro-
duction in the twenty-first century.” Annual Review of Political Science 19:455–475.
Qiu, Larry D and Shengzu Wang. 2011. “FDI policy, greenfield investment and cross-
border mergers.” Review of International Economics 19(5):836–851.
Rodrik, Dani. 2018. “What do trade agreements really do?” Journal of Economic Perspectives
32(2):73–90.
Yeaple, Stephen Ross. 2009. “Firm heterogeneity and the structure of US multinational
activity.” Journal of International Economics 78(2):206–215.
Zeile, William J. 2013. “State-level R&D by multinational companies: Results from an In-
teragency data link project.” Research Spotlight availble from https://apps.bea.gov/
scb/pdf/2013/09%20September/0913_mnc_r&d_by_state.pdf.
Zeile, William J. 2014. “Research spotlight: Multinational enterprises and international
technology transfer.” Survey of Current Business 94(9):1–9.
115
4.6 Appendix: Additional Campaign Finance Models
Table A4.1: Total campaign contributions (alternative ownership indicator)
total campaign contributions (PAC-cycle)
all PACs continuing PACs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
post-domestic M&A 28, 553∗∗ −21, 983∗ 36, 708∗∗ −14, 346
(10, 149) (8, 585) (12, 225) (10, 568)
post-foreign M&A 28, 922∗ 24, 402∗ 24, 829 26, 840∗
(11, 569) (10, 136) (12, 971) (11, 206)
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,575 1,575 1,065 1,065
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.576 0.008 0.559
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table A4.2: Total campaign contributions (‘post-domestic M&A’ as reference group)
total campaign contributions (PAC-cycle)
all PACs continuing PACs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
pre-acquisition −14, 580 11, 818 −28, 307∗ 5, 901
(8, 524) (6, 706) (11, 023) (9, 168)
post-foreign M&A 4, 256 36, 355∗∗ −6, 547 36, 638∗∗
(11, 547) (11, 344) (13, 593) (13, 932)
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,575 1,575 1,065 1,065
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.575 0.005 0.559
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
116
Table A4.3: Total campaign contributions only among MNCs
total campaign contributions (PAC-cycle)
all PACs continuing PACs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
post-domestic M&A 8, 261 −16, 533 23, 104 −9, 806
(10, 677) (8, 750) (14, 037) (12, 086)
post-foreign M&A 12, 523 24, 398∗ 15, 999 30, 603∗∗
(10, 907) (9, 804) (12, 856) (11, 196)
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,185 1,185 804 804
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.546 0.002 0.539
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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4.7 Appendix: Additional Lobbying Models
Table A4.4: Total lobbying spending (10,000 or 5,000 imputed for reports with unspecified amount)
total lobbying spending (firm-year) in logs
all firms continuing firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
post-domestic M&A −0.43∗∗∗ −0.03 −0.30∗ 0.23
(0.13) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14)
post-foreign M&A −0.12 0.36∗ −0.09 0.41∗
(0.15) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18)
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 5,808 5,808 4,112 4,112
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.431 0.001 0.450
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table A4.5: Total lobbying spending (0 imputed for reports with unspecified amount)
total lobbying spending (firm-year) in logs
all firms continuing firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
post-domestic M&A −1.11∗∗∗ −0.70∗∗∗ −0.71∗∗∗ 0.41∗
(0.17) (0.16) (0.19) (0.19)
post-foreign M&A −0.17 0.26 −0.08 0.78∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.23)
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 5,808 5,808 3,589 3,589
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.496 0.003 0.449
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Table A4.6: Total lobbying spending (‘post-domestic M&A’ as reference group)
total lobbying spending (firm-year) in logs
all firms continuing firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
pre-M&A 0.48∗∗∗ 0.08 0.34∗ −0.18
(0.13) (0.12) (0.15) (0.14)
post-foreign M&A 0.35∗ 0.43∗ 0.26 0.22
(0.18) (0.21) (0.19) (0.22)
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 5,808 5,808 4,112 4,112
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.444 0.001 0.462
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table A4.7: Issue-specific lobbying spending (‘post-domestic M&A’ as reference group)
lobbying spending per issue code (firm-year) in logs
all firms continuing firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
pre-M&A 0.08 0.04 −0.02 −0.13
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
post-foreign M&A 0.24∗∗ 0.29∗∗ 0.19∗ 0.20
(0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 4,973 4,973 3,503 3,503
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.431 0.002 0.436
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Table A4.8: Total lobbying spending only among MNCs
total lobbying spending (firm-year) in logs
all firms continuing firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
post-domestic M&A −0.81∗∗∗ −0.44∗∗ −0.81∗∗∗ −0.26
(0.17) (0.16) (0.19) (0.19)
post-foreign M&A −0.23 0.34∗ −0.28 0.39∗
(0.16) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18)
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 4,365 4,365 2,922 2,922
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.441 0.005 0.460
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table A4.9: Issue-specific lobbying spending only among MNCs
total lobbying spending (firm-year) in logs
all firms continuing firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
post-domestic M&A −0.23∗∗ −0.22∗∗ −0.14 −0.08
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
post-foreign M&A 0.12 0.25∗∗ 0.16∗ 0.31∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 3,752 3,752 2,509 2,509
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.421 0.003 0.425
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Figure A4.1: Top 10 issue codes with largest differences between foreign- and American-acquired firms
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Chapter 5
Discussion
In light of much scrutiny on Capitol Hill regarding whether and how to regulate foreign
interference in US politics, this dissertation provides a timely investigation of an under-
studied mechanism of foreign influence in the US. The political foreign investment theory
proposed here suggests that foreign direct investment can be politically driven. Foreign
firms have strong interests in US politics, as US policies have large implications for the
profitability of their global businesses. Meanwhile, legal restrictions on foreign firms’ po-
litical engagement in the US motivate the firms to gain local presence in the US by invest-
ing, an action that would grant their domestic subsidiaries equal standing to American
firms under US federal election and lobbying laws.
InChapters 2 to 4, I provide empirical evidence that suggests that domestic subsidiaries
of foreign firms play a substantial political role in theUS. InChapter 2, I identify and exam-
ine the patterns of PAC giving bymajority foreign-owned domestic subsidiaries. Through
this I find that US subsidiaries of foreign firms engage in federal elections disproportion-
ately to their economic presence in the US, and I demonstrate that this outsized political
engagement is primarily driven by the foreign parents’ desire to gain influence over federal
elections in the US. Notably, these findings are not consistent with findings from earlier
literature that viewed the political engagement of domestic subsidiaries as merely an act
to gain legitimacy in the US, and suggested that the subsidiaries are less politically active
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than their American peers. However, these earlier studies were based on unrepresenta-
tive data on foreign multinationals in the US, and I refute those findings by studying the
population of politically active domestic subsidiaries in the US.
Whilemost studies on foreign lobbying have examined the ForeignAgents Registration
Act, the political foreign investment theory led me to investigate how much of foreign-
connected lobbying has been ongoing under the domestic lobbying law. As shown in
Chapter 3, foreign-connected lobbying under the Lobbying Disclosure Act is roughly 70%
the amount of entire FARA spending by all foreign governments, foreign political parties,
and foreign-based organizations and non-US citizens. Moreover, I find that most of the
foreign-connected clients under the LDA are in fact domestic subsidiaries of foreign firms.
These subsidiaries, again, engage in lobbying activities more extensively than American
firms, controlling for firm size, industry, location, the extent of global integration, and
even their engagement in federal elections. This further suggests that the political role of
domestic subsidiaries is significant, and yet has been largely overlooked.
Finally, in Chapter 4 I study within-firm changes in political activities to build a causal
case for the political foreign investment theory. Specifically, I examine firms that experi-
enced majority ownership changes through cross-border M&A, the dominant form of for-
eign direct investment into the US. Findings here are consistent with results from the ear-
lier Chapters. Domestic firms become more politically active when they become foreign-
owned: the same firm tends to increase spending on PAC activities and lobbying activities
post-foreign M&A, and changes in lobbying focus suggest that the newly acquired firms
now lobby on behalf of their foreign parents. Meanwhile, such changes do not occur for
M&A deals between domestic firms.
Circling back to the beginning of this dissertation, the growing influence of foreign
firms on US politics has been largely ignored. Part of the reason has been that earlier work
focused on the political dominance ofWestern firms. But another important reasonmay be
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the naïve assumption that the ‘principal place of business’ of a firm determines its political
interests, even in a globally integrated economy. In this vein, this dissertation broadens
our theoretical understanding of howglobally integrated firmsdefine their interests across
borders, which motivate them to engage in the politics of countries outside of their own.
The studies also point to what kind of legal loopholes might enable multinational firms to
grow their political influence in host countries.
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